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VULTURES OR VANGUARDS?:  THE ROLE OF LITIGATION 
IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
Jill E. Fisch* 
Caroline M. Gentile** 
ABSTRACT 
The market for sovereign debt differs from the market for corporate 
debt in several important ways including the risk of opportunistic 
default by sovereign debtors, the importance of political pressures, 
and the presence of international development organizations.  
Moreover, countries are subject to neither liquidation nor 
standardized processes of debt reorganization.  Instead, negotiations 
between a sovereign debtor and its creditors lead to a voluntary 
restructuring of the sovereign’s debt. 
One of the greatest difficulties in restructuring claims against 
sovereign debtors is balancing the interests of the majority of the 
creditors with those of minority creditors.  Holdout creditors serve as 
a check on opportunistic defaults and unreasonable restructuring 
terms, yet their presence can interfere with the restructuring process.  
In this Article, we examine the role of holdout creditors within the 
context of the international capital markets.  In particular, we 
consider the effect of a litigation remedy on the power of holdout 
creditors to influence current restructurings of sovereign debt. 
Recent commentators have criticized holdout creditors and proposed 
mechanisms designed to reduce their power―particularly their 
power to enforce contractual claims against sovereign debtors 
through litigation.  We argue that these proposals may undervalue the 
role of holdout creditors in facilitating the restructuring process and 
in promoting the functioning of the international capital markets.  
Accordingly, we suggest that, prior to the implementation of broad 
reforms, the value of holdouts be tested through a market-based 
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the Conference on Sovereign Debt: The View from the Legal Academy, at Georgetown University Law 
Center, and the Sloan Conference on Corporations, Markets, and the State, at George Washington University 
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approach.  We propose several modifications to the terms of 
agreements governing sovereign bonds that can be tested in the  
market as a mechanism for assessing the value of holdout litigation in 
the international financial architecture. 
*  *  * 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent financial crises in Latin America, Asia, Russia, and the Middle East 
hve resulted in widespread restructurings of sovereign debt.  The resolution of 
these sovereign insolvencies differs from the resolution of corporate 
insolvencies in several key ways.  Most significantly, because countries are not 
subject to liquidation or standardized processes of reorganization such as those 
provided by bankruptcy law, the process involves a series of negotiations 
between the sovereign debtor and its creditors to devise a voluntary 
restructuring of the debt.  Lacking both the threat of liquidation and regulatory 
oversight, a sovereign debtor may choose to default on its obligations to its 
creditors rather than to make the internal financial sacrifices that would enable 
it to make the required payments on its debt.  A default of this type, when the 
sovereign debtor is unwilling, but not unable, to pay is often termed an 
“opportunistic default.”  Even in cases in which a sovereign debtor is truly 
experiencing financial distress, the absence of a formal proceeding for 
evaluating the debtor’s financial condition creates a risk of unreasonable 
restructuring terms.  Finally, because a restructuring plan need not adhere to 
legislative standards or secure judicial review, it may discriminate against 
minority creditors. 
Political factors may also influence the restructuring process.  For example, 
by manipulating banking regulations, the governments of the countries in 
which creditor banks are chartered may pressure those banks to provide 
additional financing to strategically important sovereign debtors.  At the same 
time, international development organizations, including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, can influence the restructuring 
process by imposing conditions on the loans that they provide to resolve 
temporary liquidity crises.  These conditions typically include mandated 
changes in macroeconomic policies and may include the privatization of state-
owned entities. 
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The challenge in restructuring sovereign debt is to manage these 
complexities so as to engineer a voluntary process by which a sovereign debtor 
and its creditors can negotiate a workable schedule of debt payments without 
irreparably damaging market confidence.  Extended restructuring processes 
during which payments on existing debt are suspended, repayment terms that 
appear to be unreasonably low, and unequal treatment of creditors, all threaten 
not only the success of individual restructurings but also the long-term strength 
of the international capital markets. 
Given the voluntary nature of the restructuring process, creditors may 
refuse to participate in a restructuring and instead “hold out” in the hope of 
receiving better repayment terms or even the full value of their claims.  These 
recalcitrant creditors may seek payments from the sovereign debtor, or they 
may seek to have their claims purchased by other creditors that are anxious to 
complete the restructuring.  In any event, holdout creditors are typically subject 
to significant pressure to accede to the terms that are acceptable to a majority 
of the creditors in the restructuring.  They are also often subject to extensive 
criticism.  Holdout creditors have been charged with delaying the restructuring 
process, thereby imposing unnecessary burdens on the citizens of the sovereign 
debtors.  They have also been denounced for seeking payments for themselves 
at the expense of other creditors and at the risk of jeopardizing the 
restructuring. 
Over the course of the past several years, holdout creditors―particularly 
vulture funds―have increasingly used litigation as a means of pursuing their 
interests.1  Specifically, these creditors have filed lawsuits to enforce their 
contractual claims against sovereign debtors.2  In some cases, the litigation has 
been remarkably successful.  The use of litigation has heightened concerns 
regarding holdout creditors.  Anne Krueger, the First Deputy Managing 
Director of the IMF, observed that: 
 
 1 The term “vulture funds” generally refers to investment funds, particularly hedge funds and mutual 
funds, that purchase the debt of countries, or companies, that are in financial distress.  These funds thus 
become creditors of the countries, or companies, through purchases of debt in the secondary market, rather 
than as primary lenders. 
 2 Due to the financial distress of the country, vulture funds are typically able to purchase the country’s 
debt at substantial discounts from its face value.  Upon purchase of the debt, the vulture funds become entitled 
to the full value of the claims—typically unpaid interest plus the principal amounts.  Consequently, vulture 
funds have strong incentives to hold out.  For a discussion of the nature of the investments that vulture funds 
make in distressed debt, and the incentives that they face, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, 
Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1214, 1233-40 (1991). 
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the more recent success of an aggressive legal strategy employed 
against Peru by a vulture company . . . underlines the power the 
holdout creditors retain.  The threat of disruption [of the restructuring 
process] remains likely to deter countries from seeking a necessary 
restructuring for longer than is desirable for either the country itself 
or the international community.3 
Concerns about holdout litigation have acquired new urgency in the wake 
of Argentina’s current financial crisis.  This crisis, which includes the largest 
sovereign default in history, came to a head in December of 2001 when 
Argentina defaulted on billions of dollars of outstanding bonds.4  Months later, 
in September of 2003, Argentina proposed to restructure approximately $94 
billion in public debt through a debt swap resulting in a seventy-five percent 
reduction in the face value of the debt and forgiveness of past due interest.5  
The proposal has been widely denounced by creditors, particularly vulture 
funds,6 and it has spurred an unprecedented amount of litigation.7 
The increasing prominence of holdout litigation has invigorated proposals 
to limit the power of holdout creditors.  Recent reform proposals include (1) a 
 
 3 Anne Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, Address at the National Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner, American Enterprise 
Institute (Nov. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Krueger, New Approach], at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ 
speeches/2001/112601.htm.  In a later speech, Dr. Krueger warned that “recent legal action against Peru shows 
that holdouts can try to extract full payment from the sovereign [debtor] by threatening to interrupt payments 
on the restructured debt, rather than by trying to seize assets.  This possibility may make potentially more 
cooperative creditors more reluctant to participate in a restructuring.”  Anne Krueger, New Approaches to 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, Address at the Conference on Sovereign Debt 
Workouts: Hopes and Hazards?, Institute for International Economics (Apr. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Krueger, 
Update], at http://www.imf. org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm. 
 4 John Barham, Cooking Up a New Solution, LATINFINANCE, June 2003, at 10; see also Richard Lapper, 
Argentina Plans Bonds Linked to Future GDP, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at 2 (discussing the financial crisis 
in Argentina and the default on Argentina’s sovereign debt). 
 5 Argentina: Minister, Official Reveal More Details of Debt Proposal, BBC MONITORING INT’L REPS., 
Sept. 25, 2003; see Angela Pruitt, Argentine Bonds May Weaken More, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2003, at C15 
(describing the proposed reduction in the face value of the debt). 
 6 Dennis Small, ‘Vulture Funds’ Descend on Dying Third World Economies, EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE 
REV., Oct. 10, 2003, available at http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2003/3039vultur_fnds.html. 
 7 See Joshua Goodman, Argentina President Berates Bondholders, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2004, at 2 
(describing legal challenges to Argentina’s restructuring proposal); Angela Pruitt, U.S. Ruling a Setback for 
Argentina, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2004, at B4 (describing judicial approval of “the first class action motion . . . in 
a major sovereign debt restructuring” and explaining that Argentina is facing lawsuits from disgruntled 
investors involving claims of more than $750 million); Jenny Wiggins, Hopes Remain for Negotiated 
Settlement, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at 45 (describing negotiations regarding Argentina’s restructuring 
proposal and noting that “[a]n increasing number of investors are filing lawsuits to try to recover the principal 
and interest on their bonds, and the bondholders’ committee this week warned of ‘a flood of litigation by retail 
and institutional bondholders globally’ if Argentina fails to reach some kind of consensual transaction”). 
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market-based approach in which a sovereign debtor restructures its debt 
through an exchange offer coupled with amendments to the terms of the debt 
effected through exit consents, (2) a contract-based method involving the use 
of collective action clauses (CACs) that permit the majority of the creditors to 
amend the terms of the debt over the objections of minority creditors, and (3) a 
regulatory-based mechanism in the form of an international bankruptcy 
procedure, which is known as the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(SDRM).  Despite the differences in approach, discussions of the merits of 
these reforms have focused almost exclusively on their capacity to constrain 
the ability of recalcitrant creditors to enforce their claims against sovereign 
debtors by filing lawsuits. 
This focus on curtailing holdout litigation, however, overlooks the benefits 
that holdout creditors, particularly vulture funds, confer on the restructuring 
process as well as the role that legal actions play in empowering creditors 
relative to debtors and minority creditors relative to the majority of the 
creditors.  Holdout creditors, by refusing to participate in restructurings of 
sovereign debt, serve as a check on opportunistic defaults and onerous 
restructuring terms.  Moreover, the prospect of holdout by minority creditors 
may limit collusive behavior among the majority of the creditors.    Holdout 
creditors, particularly vulture funds, also promote the functioning of the 
international capital markets.  For example, by reducing the likelihood of 
opportunistic defaults, holdout creditors increase capital flows to sovereign 
debtors.  Holdout creditors also provide value independent of the restructuring 
process by increasing liquidity in the market for sovereign debt, especially 
distressed debt.  The extent to which holdout creditors provide those values in 
these ways depends upon the power conferred through judicial enforcement of 
their claims against sovereign debtors. 
Yet, holdout litigation is not an unqualified good.  In some cases, the 
disruptive effects of holdout litigation outweigh its positive effects.  We argue, 
however, that critics of holdout litigation have not made the case for broad 
reforms that would eliminate holdout litigation.  Instead, the potential for 
detrimental litigation can be reduced through more narrowly tailored 
refinements to the litigation remedy implemented through market-based 
changes in the terms of agreements governing sovereign bonds.  The reaction 
of the market to these changes offers a valuable opportunity to evaluate further 
the role of holdout litigation. 
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This Article proceeds in Part I by describing the salient features of the 
restructuring process, beginning with the nature of sovereign default and then 
turning to the historical developments leading to the use of litigation in 
response to defaults.  Part II reviews the development of litigation by holdout 
creditors.  Part III considers the primary proposals for limiting holdout 
litigation, offers an evaluation of the role of holdout creditors and, based upon 
this assessment, suggests modest alterations to the restructuring process.  
Specifically, we emphasize the role holdout creditors may play in maintaining 
the balance between the interests of majority creditors, and those of minority 
creditors, while recognizing the importance of maintaining the integrity of the 
international capital markets.  We suggest, therefore, modifications to the 
agreements governing sovereign bonds, as a means of promoting the balance 
between these interests and protecting the markets. 
I. THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS 
A. The Possibility of Opportunistic Default 
Sovereign debt resembles commercial debt in many ways.  From the 
creditor’s perspective, in determining whether to make a loan to a particular 
debtor, the creditor must assess the likelihood the debtor will default on the 
loan and the likely recovery in the event of a default.  The creditor is 
constrained, however, in its ability to acquire full information about the debtor 
and its financial condition.  Additionally, the probability of default and the 
amount of recovery upon default will vary with events that occur after the 
making of the loan, including both events resulting from the debtor’s actions 
and events that are beyond the debtor’s control.8 
Sovereign debt, however, differs from commercial debt in important ways.  
In the sovereign debt context, the creditor’s ability to assess the probability of 
default and the probable recovery upon default is further hampered by the fact 
that the sovereign debtor may default on the loan simply because it is unwilling 
to make the required payments; that is, the debtor may default 
opportunistically.9  A sovereign’s choice of macroeconomic policies is the 
 
 8 Professor Fischel designates the former “debtor misbehavior” and the latter “exogenous events.”  
Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 134 (1989). 
 9 Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, Bailins Versus Bailouts: Financial Crises in Emerging Markets, 
Private Sector Involvement in Crisis Resolution and Alternative Approaches to Debt Restructuring, ch. 3, at 3 
(Oct. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (describing difficulties in making loans to 
sovereign borrowers). 
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product of a variety of political factors that may, in some cases, outweigh 
pressures for fiscal conservatism.  Moreover, when a default occurs, the 
creditor may be subject to pressure from regulators and the IMF regarding the 
restructuring of the loan. 
These factors will often interact with one another, complicating the 
creditor’s analysis.  For example, a sovereign debtor dependent upon export 
taxes for revenues may experience difficulties in making payments on a loan 
following declines in the prices of its exports.  These difficulties may be 
exacerbated by poor macroeconomic policies that result in stagnation.10  In this 
situation, the sovereign debtor may, regardless of its ability to make payments 
on the loan, opportunistically default on the loan.11  The default frees funds for 
the debtor to use to ameliorate the effects of the shock in prices and the 
misguided policies.  Using the funds to alleviate discontent within the 
sovereign debtor’s borders may be preferable to using the funds to make 
payments on a loan owed to a foreign creditor.12  At the same time, because the 
debtor is a government, with political and economic ties to other governments, 
the default may cause those governments to impose political pressure on  
creditors to make additional loans to the sovereign debtor. 
The risk that a sovereign debtor may opportunistically default on a loan 
aggravates the problem of “debtor moral hazard”13 in the context of sovereign 
debt.  Yet, creditors have few remedies when the sovereign debtor defaults on 
 
 10 Conversely, poor macroeconomic policies that result in stagnation may aggravate the risk that declines 
in export prices result in difficulties in making payments on the loan. 
 11 As one commentator notes, determining a sovereign debtor’s “ability to repay is in the end not a very 
difficult task.  In all but the most extreme cases, [debtors] have the ability to repay their debts. . . .  In the end, 
willingness to repay is the key to sovereign [debtor] credit analysis.”  Vincent Truglia et al., Sovereign Risk: 
Bank Deposits vs. Bonds, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, GLOBAL CREDIT RES., Oct. 1995, at 4-5.  Thus, an 
opportunistic default refers to a default “driven by unwillingness to pay rather than inability to pay.”  Nouriel 
Roubini, Do We Need a New International Bankruptcy Regime?  Comments on Bulow, Sachs and White 10 
(Apr. 2002), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/bankreg.doc. 
 12 See, e.g., François P. Gianviti, Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises: Basic Concepts and Issues, in 
5 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 309, 312-13 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1998) (describing 
negative consequences to citizens of measures taken to assure payment due on loans by sovereign debtors); see 
also Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 5 (noting that “the real question is―what level of resource mobilization 
are [sovereign debtors] willing to undertake to repay their debts?”). 
 13 Once a creditor makes a loan to a debtor, the creditor is subject to moral hazard on the part of the 
debtor, as the creditor lacks the ability to control the debtor’s actions and, in most instances, the creditor also 
lacks the ability to observe the debtor’s actions.  For a general description of the problem of moral hazard, see 
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 166-67, 195-96 (1992).  In 
the parlance of Professor Fischel, these conditions give rise to debtor misbehavior.  Fischel, supra note 8, at 
135-37.  The problems engendered by the inability to control or to observe the debtor’s actions are exacerbated 
when the creditor makes a loan to a sovereign debtor.  Roubini & Setser, supra note 9, at 4. 
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the loan.  Creditors may not force a sovereign debtor into involuntary 
bankruptcy, nor may they seek liquidation of the sovereign debtor’s assets in 
satisfaction of the amounts due under the loan.  Instead, the typical remedy for 
sovereign default is a voluntary restructuring of the loan.14 
If creditors cannot protect themselves from opportunistic defaults, access to 
loans will be restricted and borrowing costs will be higher.15  Both creditors 
and sovereign debtors, then, have interests in developing mechanisms for 
limiting the possibility of opportunistic defaults.16  As a general matter, these 
efforts, together with the other bargains between the creditors and the debtor, 
are reflected in the terms of the agreement governing the loan.17  In particular, 
a loan agreement provides creditors with the right to enforce claims against the 
debtor under specified circumstances, and the agreement contemplates that 
enforcement will involve filing suit in court.  The specific elements of a typical 
loan agreement that explicitly contemplate enforcement litigation include the 
sovereign debtor’s waiver of sovereign immunity, choice-of-law provisions 
through which the debtor submits to the laws and jurisdiction of a country with 
a well-developed judicial structure, and provisions that specify the 
requirements for the initiation of litigation.  Litigation, then, may be seen as a 
 
 14 William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Best Interest of 
Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
 15 See Roubini & Setser, supra note 9, ch. 3, at 4 (discussing the relationship between the risk of 
opportunistic default and the availability of credit). 
 16 A costly restructuring process will also deter opportunistic defaults by raising the cost to debtors of 
defaulting.  See, e.g., William Cline, The Role of the Private Sector in Resolving Financial Crises in Emerging 
Markets (Oct. 2000) (noting that international arrangements that convey the impression that default is painless 
will tend to depress capital flows to governments of emerging market economies), available at 
http://www.nber.org/~confer/2000/wisef00/cline.pdf; Michael Dooley & Sujata Verma, Rescue Packages and 
Output Losses Following Crises (June 2001) (expressing concern that reforms that would make the 
restructuring process more orderly, and so less costly, for sovereign debtors would result in fewer loans to the 
governments of emerging market economies), available at http://econ.ucsc.edu/~mpd/dooleyverma.pdf. The 
value of increasing the costs of the restructuring process is limited, of course, because a costly restructuring 
process also hinders restructuring by sovereigns with truly unsustainable debt burdens.  See Roubini, supra 
note 11, at 10 (arguing that “subject to the caveat that defaults should not be too easy (to prevent opportunistic 
defaults), an orderly debt restructuring should be the objective of an international regime that allows countries 
with unsustainable debt profiles to restructure their liabilities”). 
 17 For a loan traded in the capital markets, the terms of the agreement, together with all of the other 
factors affecting the loan―the difficulty in obtaining information regarding the financial policies and position 
of the sovereign debtor, the likelihood of default and the likely recovery on default, the possibility of political 
pressure, and the probability of involvement by the IMF―are reflected in the price of the loan.  See RICHARD 
A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 347-51 (7th ed. 2003) (describing 
the efficient capital markets hypothesis, which predicts that, for all securities traded in the capital markets, the 
prices reflect available information); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 565-88 (1984) (describing the role of trading in efficient capital markets). 
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check on the possibility of opportunistic default, which in turn facilitates the 
functioning of the international capital markets.  Litigation may also operate as 
a check on the terms of a proposed restructuring, giving a creditor recourse 
against a restructuring that provides insufficient value to creditors or that 
unduly favors some creditors over others. 
B. The Sovereign Debt Market 
Concerns regarding the likelihood of opportunistic defaults, and the best 
means of ensuring the effectiveness of the restructuring process in limiting 
these defaults, have long been part of the fabric of the sovereign debt market.  
These concerns have been prudent.  The history of sovereign lending, 
particularly to the governments of the emerging market economies of Latin 
America, reflects a series of crises―one in the 1930s, one in the 1980s, and the 
current crisis.  A review of the past crises provides a framework for analyzing 
the role of holdout litigation today.18  In particular, a historical perspective 
highlights the importance of developments in both the capital markets and the 
courts to the emergence of holdout litigation. 
1. The Crisis of the 1930s 
Following World War I, foreign governments, particularly the governments 
of Latin American countries, began to issue large amounts of bonds in New 
York City.19  In the early 1920s, the principal issuers of sovereign bonds were 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba.20  Over the course of the decade, as the 
bond market grew, banks established an extensive network of branches “that 
successfully marketed the bonds to individual investors, eager for the large 
premia they offered over domestic returns.”21  Between 1920 and 1929, 
 
 18 See, e.g., Deepak Lal, The Structure of International Capital Markets, in SOVEREIGN DEBT: ORIGINS, 
CRISES AND RESTRUCTURING 61, 61 (Vinod K. Aggarwal & Brigitte Granville eds., 2003) (describing a 
historical perspective as essential); Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 6 (describing study of past sovereign 
defaults as a useful tool in providing insights into possible future developments). 
 19 During the 1920s, the governments of Latin American countries issued over $2 billion in bonds in 
New York City, accounting for approximately one quarter of the new capital issues floated in the United 
States.  Erika Jorgensen & Jeffrey Sachs, Default and Renegotiation of Latin American Foreign Bonds in the 
Interwar Period, in THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 48, 51-52 (Barry 
Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert eds., 1989).  As a general matter, banks arranged loans that were then floated 
as tradable securities in the market.  Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 7. 
 20 Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 53. 
 21 Id. at 56. 
  
1056 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53 
sovereign debtors in Latin America issued bonds totaling $2.1 billion in 
value.22 
With the beginning of the Great Depression, these sovereign debtors 
experienced difficulty servicing their bonds.23  In December 1930, Bolivia 
failed to meet sinking fund requirements on its bonds, and in January 1931, the 
fiscal agent for the bonds declared Bolivia to be in default.24  This default was 
soon followed by defaults on bonds issued by Peru and Chile.25  By 1933, 
twelve Latin American debtors suspended at least part of their debt servicing,26 
and by 1934, only Argentina, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic had not 
suspended normal debt servicing.27 
In an effort to resolve the crisis, bondholders formed committees to 
negotiate with sovereign debtors.28  Initially, in the United States, these 
committees were ad hoc committees formed by bondholders to negotiate with 
each sovereign debtor in default.  These informal committees suffered from 
high administrative expenses, lack of authority to speak for the bondholders, 
and only limited contact with the federal government.29  In addition, a 
proliferation of committees created competition in negotiations with sovereign 
debtors.30  In response to these problems, and because many bondholders 
 
 22 JOHN T. MADDEN ET AL., AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE AS A CREDITOR NATION 77 (1937). 
 23 See Vinod K. Aggarwal, The Evolution of Debt Crises: Origins, Management and Policy Lessons, in 
SOVEREIGN DEBT, supra note 18, at 11, 13 (noting that the depression “crushed the [debt] servicing prospects 
of Latin American debtors”); Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 57 (stating that the combined effects of the 
worldwide economic depression, protectionist measures in the United States and Europe, and the disruption of 
the international capital markets devastated not only trade but also government revenues). 
 24 Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 58. 
 25 Id. at 58-61. 
 26 Aggarwal, supra note 23, at 13. 
 27 H. C. Wallich, The Future of Latin American Dollar Bonds, 33 AM. ECON. L. REV. 321 (1943). 
 28 Rory Macmillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-Out System, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 57, 84 
(1995) [hereinafter Macmillan, Debt Work-Out System].  Some bondholders pursued redress through the banks 
that participated in the issuance of the bonds.  The banks, however, lacked incentives to seek meaningful 
compensation for the bondholders.  They were the fiscal agents for the bonds, and they desired to maintain 
favorable relationships with the sovereign debtors as a means of securing additional financing opportunities.  
As a result, the claims of the bondholders remained unsatisfied.  See, e.g., 5 SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, SEC 
REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF 
PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 512-31 (1937) (critiquing the pursuit of claims through the 
banks); Rory Macmillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 305, 338 (1995) [hereinafter 
Macmillan, Debt Crisis] (describing the shortcomings of pursuing claims through the banks). 
 29 Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, After the Deluge: Default, Negotiation and Readjustment During 
the Interwar Years, in THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 19, at 12, 16. 
 30 Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors, 
in CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 3, 21 (Barry Eichengreen & Richard 
Portes eds., 1995). 
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sought the assistance of the federal government in resolving their claims 
against sovereign debtors, the Department of State, the Department of the 
Treasury, and the Federal Trade Commission invited a group of prominent 
citizens to meet with governmental officials to discuss the formation of an 
unofficial council to assist bondholders.31  Several months later, on December 
13, 1933, the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc. (Council) was 
incorporated as a nonprofit membership organization under the laws of 
Maryland.32  The Council lacked the authority to bind bondholders to 
restructuring plans; instead “it initiat[ed] negotiations with [sovereign debtors] 
by virtue alone of its prestige as a semiofficial organization.”33  Upon 
completing negotiations with sovereign debtors, the Council recommended 
settlements to bondholders, which accepted or rejected the settlements.34  
Further concessions from sovereign debtors were rare once the Council 
recommended a settlement, because the Council ceased negotiations.35 
The negotiations between bondholders, represented by the Council (or 
another association), and a sovereign debtor in default on its bonds were quite 
lengthy, taking years and even decades to complete. For example, the 
negotiations regarding the bonds issued by Bolivia were not completed until a 
 
 31 See EDWIN BORCHARD, 1 STATE SOLVENCY AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS 193-94 (1951) (describing 
the initial plans for the formation of a council to represent bondholders); Michael R. Adamson, The Failure of 
the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council Experiment, 1934-1940, 76 BUS. HIST. REV. 479, 487 (2002) 
(describing the role of the State Department in the formation of the council).  Before action on the group’s 
recommendation could be taken, Congress authorized the creation of a quasi-governmental agency to assist 
bondholders.  The effectiveness of the statute, however, was postponed “until the President found it in the 
public interest.  Since the President never so found, [the statute] never came into force.”  BORCHARD, supra, at 
194. 
 32 BORCHARD, supra note 31, at 196.  The members of the Council were divided into three classes: full 
members, who served as directors  and were entitled to vote to recommend restructuring plans to bondholders; 
contributing members, who were entitled to attend meetings of the Council but were not entitled to vote on 
matters before the Council; and founders.  The work of the Council was accomplished through an executive 
committee and its officers.  The executive committee members and officers, who were chosen for their 
expertise in international law and finance, received salaries for their services.  Financing for the Council was 
initially provided by commercial banks.  Upon successfully concluding settlement negotiations, the Council 
solicited contributions from the sovereign debtors and the bondholders.  The Council also received 
contributions from the founders.  See id.  at 193-98 (describing the formation and operation of the Council). 
  Similar associations designed to serve the interests of bondholders existed in the United Kingdom and 
France, as well as in other creditor countries.  Most notably, in the case of the United Kingdom, the 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, founded in 1868 and reorganized in 1898 by an act of Parliament, 
became, by the 1930s, the universally acknowledged representative of British bondholders.  Eichengreen & 
Portes, supra note 29, at 15-16. 
 33 BORCHARD, supra note 31, at 198. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 70. 
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settlement was reached in 1958.36  As a consequence of these protracted 
negotiations, the market for sovereign bonds evaporated.  In the years 
following the crisis of the 1930s, the majority of loans to the governments of 
emerging market economies in Latin America were made by public 
institutions, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank, as well as by other countries, notably the United States.37 
2. The Crisis of the 1980s 
A fundamental shift in this pattern of lending and borrowing occurred in 
the 1970s as international commercial banks located in the United States and 
Western Europe became the principal source of loans to sovereign debtors in 
Latin America.  The oil crises of the decade, beginning with the dramatic 
increase in oil prices in 1973,38 provided both the funds and the incentives for 
the commercial banks to make the loans.  Oil-exporting countries, unable to 
spend on imports the revenues they received from their exports, deposited 
surplus “petrodollars” with the banks.  The banks, seeking high rates of return 
on investments of the deposits, faced limited demand for loans among the 
industrialized countries as economic recessions in those countries reduced the 
need for capital.  The governments of the emerging market economies in Latin 
America, however, desired loans to finance their more costly imports of oil.  
Consequently, the banks recycled the petrodollars into loans to these sovereign 
debtors.39 
In August 1982, Mexico declared that the country could no longer service 
its debts to foreign creditors, especially commercial banks.40  In the ensuing 
months, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela made similar 
 
 36 The negotiations regarding the bonds issued by Bolivia, the first country to default on its bonds in 
1931, were not completed until a settlement was reached in 1958.  Eichengreen & Portes, supra note 30, at 21.  
Negotiations regarding the other twelve Latin American debtors to suspend at least part of their debt servicing 
continued into the 1960s.  Aggarwal, supra note 23, at 13. 
 37 Aggarwal, supra note 23, at 14; Eichengreen & Portes, supra note 30, at 22-23. 
 38 The price of crude oil, which was less than $3 per barrel at the end of 1973, rose to over $17 per barrel 
by the end of 1979.  LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC MACHINERY 
154 (2003). 
 39 See id. (describing the impact of the oil crises on commercial banks); Stephen Bainbridge, Comity and 
Sovereign Debt Litigation: A Bankruptcy Analogy, 10 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1, 5-7 (1986) (discussing the 
factors resulting in the recycling of petrodollars). 
 40 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 156. 
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announcements.41  In subsequent years, many other sovereign debtors fell into 
arrears on their debts, and several sovereign debtors suspended debt service 
altogether.42 
In working to restructure their debts, these sovereign debtors engaged in 
negotiations with bank advisory committees regarding their commercial 
loans.43  Typically, a sovereign debtor designated the commercial bank that 
had extended it the largest loan to serve as the chair of a bank advisory 
committee.44  The chair of the committee, in consultation with the sovereign 
debtor, invited other commercial banks that had made loans to the debtor to 
join the committee.45  The composition of the committee was important, as 
members of the committee had to be able to reach a consensus among 
themselves regarding a plan to restructure the commercial loans that was  
acceptable to the sovereign debtor. The committee also had to be able to 
convince the other commercial banks to support the plan.46  To facilitate these 
efforts, committee members were chosen based on the geographic location of 
the bank and the size of the loans made to the debtor.47  The members of each 
bank advisory committee were generally large commercial banks located in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, France, and 
Canada that had made large loans to the sovereign debtor.48 
The official role of the bank advisory committees was to serve as conduits 
of information between sovereign debtors and commercial banks.49  Bank 
 
 41 See Philip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implications for 
Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2708 (1996) (describing defaults among sovereign debtors 
in Latin America). 
 42 See Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 10 (stating that “[a]ll told, approximately [fifty] countries have 
defaulted on their sovereign and commercial obligations since August 1982”); see also RIEFFEL, supra note 38, 
at 154 (stating that the oil crisis of 1979, coupled with the recession of the early 1980s and a rise in borrowing 
costs, hindered the ability of Latin American countries to service their debt). 
 43 The use of bank advisory committees began, and the process developed, with a series of five 
negotiations taking place from 1976 to 1980 involving loans made to Zaire, Peru, Sudan, Turkey, and Poland.  
See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 97, 295-316 (describing the evolution of bank advisory committees).     
 44 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 116. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Charles Lipson, Bankers’ Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts, in 
COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 200, 207 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986) (describing the role of bank advisory 
committees). 
 47 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 116.  Typically, bank advisory committees consisted of between ten and 
fifteen members.  See James B. Hurlock, Advising Sovereign Clients on the Renegotiation of Their External 
Indebtedness, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 29, 39 (1984) (describing the composition of bank advisory 
committees). 
 48 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 217-18 (describing the composition of bank advisory committees). 
 49 See Alfred Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure: A Perspective of Counsel to Agent Banks, Bank 
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advisory committees described their function as serving as “communications 
link[s]” between sovereign debtors and commercial banks.50  In practice, 
however, bank advisory committees negotiated the terms of restructurings of 
commercial loans with sovereign debtors. 51  Bank advisory committees lacked 
formal authority to bind the commercial banks to restructuring plans.52  The 
bank advisory committees instead advised the commercial banks of the terms 
of the plans and then sought their ratification.53  These informal 
arrangements―the use of bank advisory committees and the standard process 
they followed in negotiating with sovereign debtors―are often referred to as 
the “London Club” to differentiate them from the formal negotiations between 
governments, known as the “Paris Club.”54   
The bank advisory committees, in negotiating restructurings of sovereign 
loans, adhered to a principle of treating all commercial banks equally.55  More 
specifically, the committees sought to ensure the uniform treatment of all 
commercial loans―like types of debt were to be treated alike56―and they also 
 
Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 59, 65-66 (1984) (describing the function 
of bank advisory committees). 
 50 Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process on Inter-
Creditor Relationships, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 493, 506. 
 51 Id. 
 52 The commercial banks did not designate the bank advisory committees as their representatives.  
Moreover, upon the declaration of a moratorium on the servicing of obligations, including commercial loans, 
the commercial banks retained the right to pursue legal remedies against the sovereign debtors.  See id. at 504 
(describing the consequences of a moratorium). 
 53 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 217-18 (describing the process by which bank advisory committees 
operated). 
 54 See Daniel McGovern, Different Market Windows on Sovereign Debt: Private-Sector Credit from the 
1980s to the Present, in SOVEREIGN DEBT, supra note 18, at 82-83 (describing characteristics of the London 
Club). 
 55 Sovereign debtors also followed the principle of equal treatment of creditors.  Buchheit & Reisner, 
supra note 50, at 504-05.  In announcing that a restructuring had commenced, a sovereign debtor included 
assurances that all commercial banks would be treated equally.  Id.  Lee Buchheit and Ralph Reisner note: 
These assurances have one objective—to engender moral responsibility among the various 
creditors that will forestall more disgruntled banks from resorting to legal remedies.  Partly for 
this reason, telexes from [sovereign debtors] announcing the commencement of a generalized 
debt restructuring are often accompanied by a communication from the largest commercial bank 
lenders to the [debtor] confirming their willingness to forebear from exercising their legal rights 
if the international banking community as a whole evidences a similar restraint. 
Id. at 504. 
 56 Lipson, supra note 46, at 211.  The restructuring process generally encompassed commercial loans, 
while other types of debt were excluded from the process.  Very short-term obligations such as suppliers’ 
credits and trade-related credits were generally not included within the restructuring process.  Buchheit & 
Reisner, supra note 50, at 515-16.  Officially guaranteed loans were generally the subject of negotiations with 
the creditor governments, working informally through the Paris Club.  Lipson, supra note 46, at 212.  Publicly 
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sought uniformity in “the important areas of pricing, fees, tenor, amortization, 
and legal documentation.”57  By following a basic principle of uniformity, the 
bank advisory committees minimized the time period needed to complete the 
negotiations with sovereign debtors.58  At the same time, “the emphasis on 
uniformity also appeal[ed] to ‘simple-minded equity among banks,’ . . . and so 
[made] it harder for individual banks to hold out for special treatment.”59 
Although the members of the bank advisory committees and the other 
commercial banks supported the principle of treating all banks equally, all of 
the banks did not necessarily agree as to the most desirable treatment―that is, 
although the banks promoted the notion of a uniform agreement, they did not 
necessarily prefer the same terms.  The principal reasons for disagreements 
among the banks were differences in the sizes of the loans they had made 
relative to their total assets, differences in the regulations to which they were 
subject, differences in the nature of their business relationships with sovereign 
debtors, and differences in their level of participation in the international 
capital markets. 
The large commercial banks located in the United States had made 
enormous loans to sovereign debtors in Latin America―loans with an 
aggregate value, in many instances, in excess of the total value of their assets.60  
These banks faced a very serious threat of insolvency.  They also confronted a 
difficult regulatory environment.  For banks in the United States, applicable 
regulations required that a loan be declared “nonperforming” in the event 
interest accrued on the loan was not paid within ninety days after its due date.61  
Regulations also required that all banks set aside adequate reserves for 
 
issued bonds were “good candidates for exemption from a restructuring,” Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 50, 
at 515, “because they [were] widely disbursed, and because each holder [had] legal rights to petition for 
default if payments [were] not made as scheduled.” Lipson, supra note 46, at 212. 
 57 Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 50, at 505.  Mr. Buchheit and Professor Reisner also note that 
“[d]eparting from this practice risk[ed] arousing the latent suspicion of the [commercial banks] that some 
banks will be favored over others, thereby jeopardizing the success of the entire restructuring program.”  Id. 
 58 Charles Lipson describes the norm of uniformity as having “‘the great advantage of speeding 
negotiations’. . . [that] not only minimizes negotiating time in the first rescheduling . . . but [also] makes 
subsequent [reschedulings] much easier.”  Lipson, supra note 46, at 211.  By creating a clear standard, it also 
“eases negotiations with other [sovereign debtors].”  Id. 
 59 Id. at 212. 
 60 See Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 312 n.38 (noting that the loan exposure in respect of the 
five largest sovereign debtors in Latin America, as a percentage of shareholders’ equity, was 254.7% for 
Manufacturers Hanover, 198.3% for Chase Manhattan, 179.6% for Chemical Bank, 178.6% for CitiCorp, 
166.8% for Bankers’ Trust, 145.1% for Bank America, and 134.5% for Morgan Guaranty) (citing ANATOLE 
KALETSKY, THE COSTS OF DEFAULT 112 tbl.6.3 (1985)). 
 61 See Power, supra note 41, at 2710 (describing applicable regulations). 
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nonperforming loans, called “loan-loss reserves.”62  Since the total value of the 
loans made by large commercial banks in the United States exceeded the total 
value of their assets, the banks could not create adequate loan-loss reserves. 
To prevent the insolvency of the largest commercial banks in the United 
States, the bank advisory committees worked diligently to avoid defaults.63  
Specifically, the committees devised a general plan for the restructurings in 
which sovereign debtors continued to pay interest on loans as it came due.64  
This approach, however, required commercial banks to make additional loans 
to sovereign debtors because the debtors lacked sufficient foreign currency 
reserves to pay the interest on their troubled loans.  The new loans provided the 
sovereign debtors with the cash needed to make interest payments on their 
existing loans in a timely manner. 
Consistent with the principle of treating all commercial banks equally, the 
new loans were to be made by the commercial banks ratably based upon the 
value of the loans previously made to the various sovereign debtors.  Each 
commercial bank having made loans to a sovereign debtor “as of a specified 
date [was] asked to participate in [the] new money loans in an amount that 
[was] proportional to the bank’s aggregate credit exposure in the country on 
that date.”65 
Large commercial banks located in the United States readily supported the 
approach, including the new loans, as it provided a means for these banks to 
avoid insolvency.66  These banks had two additional reasons for supporting the 
approach.  First, the banks had business relationships with the sovereign 
debtors, and they were eager to broaden those relationships.  For example, 
these banks arranged loans for sovereign debtors, and they held deposits for 
both governmental agencies and local businesses.67  These services, however, 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Alexander Nicoll, Latin American Debt Crisis: Solution Passes the Test of Time, FIN. TIMES, July 30, 
1992, at 4 (describing the essence of the strategy as one to “buy time: stretch out the problem so that 
[sovereign] debtors could introduce economic changes necessary to restore creditworthiness, and allow 
[commercial banks] to build up their capital sufficiently to absorb the shocks”). 
 64 The plan also included rescheduling of the principal amounts of the loans.  See Power, supra note 41, 
at 2709 (describing the restructuring process). 
 65 Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 50, at 508. 
 66 See Lee C. Buchheit, Alternative Techniques to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 
371, 385 (noting that “[b]etween the two evils of making an involuntary loan to a less-than-creditworthy 
borrower, or allowing existing loan assets to slip into the ‘non-performing’ category, most banks tend[ed] to 
prefer the former”). 
 67 Lipson, supra note 46, at 210. 
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were only the starting point for the businesses the banks hoped to develop;  the 
banks were also interested in providing short-term credit for private-sector 
importers and exporters and in opening branches in emerging market 
economies.68  Second, these banks were permanent participants in the 
international capital markets, and they expected to continue working with other 
large commercial banks in a variety of settings.  The members of the bank 
advisory committees “viewed debt restructuring as a regrettable but normal 
business activity,”69 and so they expected to participate with one another as 
repeat players in restructurings.  In addition, these banks participated together 
in many loan syndications,70 and they were linked to one another through the 
financial network comprising the international capital markets.71 
Other commercial banks located in the United States, smaller banks with 
small portfolios of loans to sovereign debtors, were less inclined to support the 
restructuring plans negotiated by the bank advisory committees.  For these 
banks, the total value of their loans to sovereign debtors was small relative to 
the total value of their assets.  Thus, these “smaller banks ha[d] no impending 
‘nightmare scenario.’”72 Declaring the loans to be nonperforming loans would 
not have threatened the solvency of these banks because they had adequate 
loan-loss reserves.  In addition, the smaller banks did not have business 
relationships with sovereign debtors, and they were not regular participants in 
the international capital markets.  Accordingly, these banks were not 
concerned about jeopardizing the development of future international 
business.73 
The smaller commercial banks were particularly opposed to making new 
loans to troubled sovereign debtors, a practice they viewed as “throwing good 
 
 68 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 106-07.  In fact, Lex Rieffel characterizes the “desire to continue doing 
business” with sovereign debtors as the “driving motivation for most banks represented on [bank advisory 
committees].”  Id. at 111. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 210-11 (describing the relationships among commercial banks).  In a 
syndicated loan, a group of commercial banks join together to advance funds to a particular debtor under one 
loan agreement.  See Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 50, at 500 (describing nature of loan syndication 
process); see also Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 323 n.95 (describing the nature of syndicated 
loans). 
 71 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 210-11 (describing the relationships among commercial banks). 
 72 Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 324. 
 73 Lipson, supra note 46, at 214 (describing the role of smaller commercial banks).  These banks did, 
though, have an effective means of recourse against sovereign debtors.  For some of these banks, loans were so 
small that the assets of the debtors located in the United States, and subject to attachment, were sufficient to 
satisfy any judgments they may have won.  See Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 18 (describing the availability of 
litigation remedies to smaller commercial banks). 
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money after bad.”74  In addition, these banks recognized that the larger 
commercial banks were facing threats of insolvency.  The smaller banks, thus, 
viewed the larger banks as having strong incentives not only to make new 
loans as specified in the restructuring plans but also to commit additional funds 
to cover any shortfalls in the values of the total loan packages arising from the 
refusal of the smaller banks to make new loans.75 
The bank advisory committees viewed the opposition of the smaller 
commercial banks, particularly the resistance to making new loans to sovereign 
debtors, as a threat both to the principle of treating all commercial banks 
equally and to the success of the restructuring plans.  Because the committees 
could not bind these banks to the terms of the agreements reached with 
sovereign debtors, they sought the voluntary cooperation of the smaller banks. 
Each member of the bank advisory committee bore responsibility for securing 
the cooperation of a specific group of smaller commercial banks, typically 
determined by geographic location.76  The principal focus of each large 
commercial bank in securing the cooperation of the smaller commercial banks 
located in its region was the immediate banking relationships on which each 
smaller bank relied.77  For example, officials of the large bank would warn 
their counterparts at a smaller bank that failure to cooperate might create 
 
 74 Power, supra note 41, at 2711.  The sovereign debtors, after all, were “self-declared insolvent 
debtors.” Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 324; see also Nancy P. Gibbs, A Regional Bank’s 
Perspective: An Analysis of the Differences and Similarities in the U.S. Banking Community’s Approach to 
and Participation in the Mexican Restructuring, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 11, 18 (1984) (noting that, in 
the restructuring of the loans made to Mexico, “the banks with very small exposures were reluctant to increase 
their exposure by a penny even if it meant writing off their existing [loan] portfolios”). 
 75 WILLIAM R. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE 75 (1984); see also 
Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 324 (describing this situation as “the ‘free-rider’ problem in inter-
bank relations”); Robert K. MacCallum, Note, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Rights and Duties of 
Commercial Banks Inter Sese, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 425, 435 (noting that the smaller banks, many of 
whom acquired portfolios of loans to sovereign debtors through participations in syndicated loans at the 
invitation of the large commercial banks, argued that the large banks should bear the burden of making new 
loans). 
 76 The large commercial banks generally recognized that service as a member of a bank advisory 
committee included working to secure the cooperation of the smaller commercial banks.  Lipson, supra note 
46, at 215-18. 
 77 These banking relationships were vital to the businesses of the smaller commercial banks, as they 
provided access both to participations in syndicated loans and to banking services.  These relationships were 
also tremendously important in the context of loans to sovereign debtors, including restructurings of those 
loans, because the smaller banks generally lacked access to information regarding the financial positions of the 
debtors and, in restructurings, the repayment intentions of the debtors.  For a description of the banking 
relationships on which the smaller banks relied, see id. at 220.  For a description of the difficulties of the 
smaller commercial banks in gaining access to information regarding sovereign debtors, see Power, supra note 
41, at 2712. 
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difficulties for the smaller bank in purchasing participations in new syndicated 
loans, including loans to domestic borrowers.78 
This pressure was often sufficient to cause reluctant smaller banks to ratify 
the agreements with the sovereign debtors and to support the proposed 
restructuring plans.79  In the event that it was not, federal banking regulators 
could exert additional pressure.80  In particular, the International Lending 
Supervision Act of 1983 granted regulators significant powers to require banks 
to set aside higher reserves against loans to sovereign debtors experiencing a 
“protracted inability . . . to make payments on their external indebtedness.”81  
The statute gave regulators broad discretion to determine whether or not a bank 
was required to maintain greater reserves, enabling regulators to pressure 
reluctant banks to support restructurings.82 
Finally, the IMF also exerted pressure, albeit indirectly, on dissenting 
smaller banks.  In 1982, the IMF initiated the practice of conditioning its loans 
to any troubled sovereign debtor on a commitment from all the commercial 
banks that had made loans to the debtor to make new loans.83  At the same 
time, the IMF continued its policy of requiring each sovereign debtor to 
implement austerity programs, monitored by the IMF, as a condition of 
receiving IMF loans.84  The commercial banks, in turn, required each debtor to 
adopt the austerity program proposed by the IMF and to submit to monitoring 
 
 78 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 220 (describing the tactics used by large commercial banks in pressuring 
smaller commercial banks to support restructuring plans negotiated by bank advisory committees). 
 79 “The whole point [was] to break down the large . . . game, involving hundreds of banks and 
considerable opportunities for free-riding, into a series of bilateral games pitting a few small holdouts against 
the major money-center banks.”  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 80 These regulators included the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.  Keith A. Palzer, Comment, 
Relational Contract Theory and Sovereign Debt, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 727, 742 n.82 (1988). 
 81 12 U.S.C. § 3904(a)(1)(A) (2000).  See generally Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, The U.S. Response to the 
International Debt Crisis: The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 401 (1985) 
(describing the International Lending Supervision Act). 
 82 Power, supra note 41, at 2713; see also Palzer, supra note 80, at 745 n.97 (noting that regulators used 
their authority “to impose a minimum level of reserves on banks which refuse[d] to follow the market”). 
 83 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 223 (describing the role of the IMF in pressuring smaller banks to 
support restructuring plans negotiated by bank advisory committees); see also Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra 
note 28, at 319 n.76 (noting that, “[i]n the case of Mexico, the IMF refused to give financial assistance until all 
1400 of Mexico’s commercial bank creditors had agreed to extend additional loans of $5 billion new money, 
which amounted to seven percent of their existing loan exposure”). 
 84 The austerity programs typically involved efforts to balance current accounts by restricting imports, 
devaluing local currency, and balancing domestic budgets.  See Bill Orr, After a Decade Bankers Say “Adios” 
to Latin Debt Crisis, A.B.A. BANKING J., July 1992, at 36. 
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by the IMF as a condition to receiving new loans.85  This structure of 
interrelated conditions among the IMF and the commercial banks served as a 
means of exerting pressure on smaller banks.86 
Commercial banks located outside the United States also were not inclined 
to support the restructuring plans negotiated by the bank advisory committees.  
As a general matter, commercial banks located in Western Europe had made 
relatively small loans to sovereign debtors in Latin America, particularly as 
compared to the total value of their assets.  Thus, the exposure to the crisis in 
the sovereign debt market was significantly lower for the Western European 
banks than the exposure of the large U.S. banks.87  In addition, the regulatory 
environment was, in important ways, more favorable in Western Europe than 
in the United States.  Banks in Western Europe were not required to degrade 
the value of a loan in the event that accrued interest was not paid within ninety 
days after its due date.88  The banks in Western Europe, as a result, preferred to 
capitalize accrued but unpaid interest rather than to make new loans to 
sovereign debtors.  The tension was resolved in favor of the U.S. banks simply 
because they were able to commit credibly to supporting only restructuring 
plans that provided for new loans to sovereign debtors.  The Western European 
banks, on the other hand, could not credibly refuse to support these 
restructuring plans because, although they were not the most preferred plans, 
they would not result in tremendous losses to the banks. 
The large commercial banks in the United States also appealed to the 
interests of the Western European banks by urging them to support the plans as 
a means of enhancing their relationships with sovereign debtors and their roles 
in the international capital markets.89  Once the large commercial banks in 
Western Europe agreed to the restructuring plans, they used their relationships 
with smaller commercial banks to pressure the smaller banks to ratify the 
 
 85 See Lipson, supra note 46, at 211 (noting that “[t]he difficult issue of the [sovereign] debtor’s future 
policies [was] removed from these negotiations [regarding the restructuring of the loans made by commercial 
banks]” and that “[t]he [commercial banks] simply insist[ed] on I.M.F. conditional lending and economic 
supervision”). 
 86 See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 54, at 74 (describing this system of “concerted lending” as 
“essentially a gentleman’s agreement: where (a) banks made new loans to troubled sovereigns; (b) the 
sovereigns adopted sound economic policies; (c) multinational institutions provided new adjustment lending; 
and (d) the sovereigns remained current on payments to creditors”). 
 87 See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 46, at 210-13 (describing the greater vulnerability of U.S. commercial 
banks as compared to Western European commercial banks). 
 88 Id. at 212. 
 89 Id. at 209-14 (discussing the strategy of the U.S. banks in convincing the Western European banks to 
support restructuring plans that included new loans to troubled sovereign debtors). 
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agreements and to support the plans.90 
Using the various forms of pressure available to them, the commercial 
banks concluded forty-two debt restructurings with the governments of thirty-
two countries during the period from 1982 to 1984.91  Some of the 
restructurings were completed within a few months, while other restructurings 
took several years to complete.92 
These restructurings, however, were followed by more restructurings.  The 
restructuring of Mexico’s debt was regarded as a model for other 
restructurings, yet three years later, in 1986, Mexico was unable to service the 
obligations on the loans that had been previously rescheduled. As a result, 
Mexico entered into a new series of negotiations that resulted in rescheduling 
loans in excess of $97 billion.93  Between 1983 and 1990, Mexico restructured 
its debts to foreign creditors twelve times, and many countries in Latin 
America restructured their foreign debts many times.94 
The repeated restructurings caused strains among the participating 
commercial banks.  As Lee Buchheit notes: 
The first round of debt rescheduling for a particular country may 
have enjoyed unanimous participation, but the second, third and 
fourth round did not.  Within two years of the first rescheduling, 
fissures appeared in the cohesion of the banking community: big 
banks versus little banks; regional banks versus money centre banks; 
banks in North America versus banks in Europe, Japan and the Gulf; 
banks with large loan loss reserve provisions versus banks without 
such provisions.95 
 
 90 Once the large commercial banks in Western Europe agreed to support the restructuring plans, they 
had strong incentives to induce the smaller commercial banks in their regions to support the plans, because the 
support of the smaller banks would reduce the size of the new loans the large banks would be required to 
make. 
 91 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 159. 
 92 Id. Although the restructuring of the debt Mexico owed to foreign creditors was completed within one 
year, in the case of Argentina almost three years were required to conclude the restructuring process.  Id. 
 93 See Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 333 (describing the restructuring of Mexican debt). 
 94 See Martin Wolf, On Sovereign Bankruptcies—Economic Eye, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at 22 
(discussing repeated restructurings and noting that eleven countries, including Mexico, restructured their debts 
ten or more times between 1980 and 1994). 
 95 Lee C. Buchheit, Majority Action Clauses May Help Resolve Debt Crises, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 
1998, at 13.  The bank advisory committees worked to minimize these strains.  For example, commercial 
banks were occasionally granted permission to allocate their new loans to debtors of their choice within the 
country.  In this way, the banks were permitted to maintain relationships with existing clients.  In addition, the 
restructuring plans provided a cushion in the event smaller banks refused to make new loans.  These plans 
provided for a total amount of new loans slightly greater than the amount needed to reschedule the loans.  
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Notably, these strains did not result in significant litigation.96  As a general 
matter, the commercial banks “weighed the low odds of recovering more 
money against the costs of litigation, taking into account their varying tax and 
regulatory regimes,” and they apparently concluded that “[t]he attractions of 
negotiated solutions were . . . far superior to the attractions of litigation.”97 
The strains within the banking community led, instead, to the development 
of a secondary market for loans made to sovereign debtors.  Indeed, shortly 
after the first round of debt reschedulings, commercial banks began to develop 
a small market for sovereign loans that consisted of interbank swaps.98  As the 
debt crisis deepened, many commercial banks became eager to sell, in the 
secondary market, the loans they had made to sovereign debtors.99  By selling 
 
Thus, if all the commercial banks were to make new loans as required by the plans, a small amount of excess 
financing would be provided.  See Lipson, supra note 46, at 219 (describing these efforts).  Under this 
approach, an agreement negotiated with a sovereign debtor was considered to be ratified, and the restructuring 
plan was considered to be approved, upon the acceptance of a “critical mass” of commercial banks, usually 
representing more than 95% (but less than 100%) of the total value of the loans made to a sovereign debtor.  
RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 122. 
The bank advisory committees did not, though, purchase the loans made by the dissenting banks.  As 
Professor Lipson reports the views of a syndications manager in London, “no banks have been bought out of a 
rescheduling.  ‘If we did that . . . that would be the end. [The rescheduling] would unravel like a cheap 
sweater’ as other smaller [banks] stood in line for the same deal.”  Lipson, supra note 46, at 219 (footnote 
omitted). 
 96 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 3 (noting that the debt crisis of the 1980s “produced 
remarkably little litigation”); Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York & Clifford Chance, London, 
Avoiding the Nightmare Scenario, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1992, at 19 (stating that “[w]hen one considers that 
the debt crisis has offered more than U.S. $500 [billion] of provocation to potential plaintiffs, the number of 
lawsuits actually filed . . . over the last decade has been astonishingly small”). 
 97 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 159 n.17.  Although any commercial bank, upon an event of default, had the 
right to accelerate the loan and to sue for the entire unpaid balance of the loan, the banks recognized that the 
likelihood of recovering amounts owed by sovereign debtors was very small.  The difficulties associated with 
attaching the assets of sovereign debtors are discussed infra in Part II. 
In addition, the terms of the syndicated loan agreements pursuant to which many of the loans were made 
limited the actions of the banks in the syndicate by requiring a majority vote, or a supermajority vote, to 
declare an event of default.  Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 50, at 496.  The syndicated loan agreements also 
contained sharing clauses and cross-default clauses, both of which limited the recovery that any bank might 
receive through litigation.  See, e.g., id. at 502 (describing sharing clauses); id. at 496 (describing cross-default 
clauses). 
 98 See Michael M. Chamberlin & Thomas E. Winslade, Regulating the LDC Debt Markets, INT’L FIN. L. 
REV., Aug. 1992, at 16 (describing the development of the market for interbank swaps).  The swaps were 
generally accomplished through assignments, and the assignment agreements typically provided that the 
assignee bank assumed, in addition to the right to payments on the loans, the responsibility for participating in 
future restructurings of the loans, including the making of new loans based upon the exposure level 
represented by the assigned loans.  See Lee C. Buchheit, The Evolution of Debt Restructuring Techniques, 
INT’L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1992, at 10 (describing the mechanics of the secondary market). 
 99 See Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 328 (noting the means by which commercial banks 
exited the sovereign debt market). 
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its loans, a bank was able to reduce its proportion of the total loans made to 
that debtor, thereby reducing the amount of new loans the bank would be 
required to make in future restructurings of the loans.100 
The debt crisis continued, fueled in part by continuing weaknesses in the 
emerging market economies of Latin America.101  At the same time, the total 
value of new loans made to the governments of these countries by commercial 
banks declined drastically, exacerbating the problems these countries faced.102  
To alleviate the continuing crisis, not only commercial banks but also the U.S. 
government sought ways to improve both the restructuring process and the 
outcomes of the restructurings. 
The commercial banks, operating through the bank advisory committees, 
introduced multiyear rescheduling agreements.  These agreements were 
designed to reduce the time and expense of annual restructurings and to form a 
basis for commercial banks to exit the sovereign debt market.103  In October of 
1985, Treasury Secretary James Baker announced a new plan for resolving the 
debt crisis entitled “Program for Sustained Economic Growth” (Baker Plan).104  
The purpose of the Baker Plan was to provide additional loans to sovereign 
debtors, from both official sources and private sources, subject to the 
commitment of each recipient to implement specified programs deemed 
important for achieving long-term growth.105  Several restructurings were 
 
 100 For sovereign debtors, the sales also provided a mechanism for eliminating the objections of dissenting 
commercial banks. 
 101 See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS REPORT IN LATIN 
AMERICA: 1990 REPORT 15 (1990) (describing the difficulties confronting these countries). 
 102 Id.  Although bankers often attributed their refusal to make new loans to poor macroeconomic policies 
on the part of these governments, at least one commentator has suggested that the decline in new loans was 
due, in part, to the recalcitrance of smaller commercial banks in refusing to support restructuring plans that 
provided for new loans to sovereign debtors.  See Paul Krugman, Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors, 
in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 299, 307-17  (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989) 
(describing the trends in lending during the period from 1982 to 1986). 
 103 As a general matter, the agreements consolidated payments falling due over several years, lengthened 
repayment periods to as long as twenty years, reduced the interest on both rescheduled loans and new loans, 
and eliminated the restructuring fee that was imposed in earlier restructurings.  In addition, some of the 
agreements contained debt-equity conversion clauses, on-lending, and trade-facility options for new-money 
commitments.  Mexico negotiated the first multiyear rescheduling agreement in 1984; the agreement covered 
principal payments over six years, from 1984 to 1989.  In addition, Argentina, Chile, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia also negotiated multiyear rescheduling agreements.  
See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 162-63 (describing experiences with multiyear rescheduling agreements). 
 104 Christine A. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, World Debt: The United States Reconsiders, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 
259, 267, 273 (1985). 
 105 See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 163 (describing the Baker Plan). 
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completed under the Baker Plan.106 
During 1987, however, “the Baker Plan was effectively abandoned as 
[commercial] banks began to experiment with a variety of debt-restructuring 
techniques that included elements of debt reduction.”107  Significantly, in April 
of 1987, Citibank, N.A. announced that it would record a loss of $2.5 billion in 
order to increase its loan-loss reserves from $2 billion to $5 billion, an amount 
equal to twenty-five percent of the bank’s exposure to loans made to sovereign 
debtors in the emerging market economies.108  Other large commercial banks 
in the United States soon made similar adjustments, and a second round of 
adjustments was announced later in the year.109  These decreases in loan 
exposure eliminated the threat of insolvency for the U.S. banks.110  Similarly, 
in 1988, commercial banks located in Western Europe and Japan increased 
their provisions for loans made to sovereign debtors in emerging market 
economies thereby reducing their exposure.111  Through these changes, 
commercial banks dramatically reduced the losses they would incur upon a 
reduction in the total value of the loans made to sovereign debtors.112 
On March 10, 1989, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady articulated a series 
of new principles for resolving debt crises, which became known as the “Brady 
 
 106 The countries completing restructurings of their debt under the Baker Plan include Mexico in March of 
1987, Argentina in August of 1987, and Brazil in November of 1988.  Id at 164. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See id. at 165 (describing changes in provisionings for loans to sovereign debtors in Latin America); 
Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 327 (same). 
 109 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 165. 
 110 In 1982, the exposure of the nine largest commercial banks located in the United States to developing-
country debt was over 250% of their capital.  By 1986, the exposure had been reduced to 167.2%, and with 
respect to only sovereign debtors in Latin America, the exposure was 97.7%.  Stanley Fischer, Sharing the 
Burden of the International Debt Crisis, 99 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 165, 166-67 (1987).  In addition, 
from 1985 to 1988, U.S. commercial banks reduced their exposure to loans made to sovereign debtors in Latin 
America by 30%, and they lowered the ratio of the value of these loans to the total value of their assets from 
245% in 1981 to less than 100% in 1989.  INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 101, at 14.  In 
1989, reserves represented 30% of the value of loans to these sovereign debtors.  Id.  The result, of course, was 
to weaken an important force for cohesiveness among the commercial banks that had made loans to sovereign 
debtors. 
 111 RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 165. 
 112 These changes also had an immediate impact on the secondary market for sovereign loans.  
Specifically, the reductions in the values of the loans recorded on the balance sheets of the banks resulted in 
large declines in the prices of the loans in the secondary market.  See id. at 167 (presenting data regarding 
prices for sovereign loans in the secondary market).  The decreases in the prices of the sovereign loans in the 
secondary market, in turn, provided additional trading opportunities and so further eroded the incentives for 
cooperation among commercial banks. 
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Plan.”113  These principles included a reduction in the total amount of debt 
owed by sovereign debtors in exchange for both a commitment on the part of 
the debtors to adopt specified reforms designed to achieve sustainable growth, 
notably the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and greater assurances of 
the collectability of the debt.  In addition, these principles included the use of 
different forms of debt to increase liquidity in the international capital markets.  
Finally, the principles included complementary support from a variety of 
official sources, including the rescheduling of loans owed to official creditors 
and new loans from bilateral aid agencies and export credit agencies.114 
To implement these policies, the loans the commercial banks made to each 
sovereign debtor participating in the Brady Plan were securitized.  The loans 
were pooled together, and then they were exchanged for Brady Bonds.  The 
bonds were sold publicly to investors.  The proceeds from the sale of the bonds 
were used to repay the loans.  As a result of these transactions, the commercial 
banks exited the sovereign debt market, and they were replaced by investors 
holding Brady Bonds.115   
 
 113 See Nicholas F. Brady, Remarks to the Brookings Institute and Bretton Woods Committee Conference 
on Third World Debt (Mar. 10, 1989), in BROOKINGS DIALOGUES ON PUBLIC POLICY, THIRD WORLD DEBT: 
THE NEXT PHASE 69 (Edward R. Fried & Philip H. Trezise eds., 1989) (outlining principles for resolving debt 
crises). 
 114 See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 170-74 (describing the Brady Plan).  In connection with the Brady Plan, 
the IMF altered its policies regarding loans to sovereign debtors in times of crisis.  Specifically, the IMF began 
providing loans to sovereign debtors so long as they were implementing a credible adjustment program and 
negotiating in good faith with the commercial banks that had made loans to them (even though the negotiations 
were not complete), and it abandoned the policy of requiring sovereign debtors to eliminate arrears before it 
would disperse new loans.  Id. 
 115 To reduce the total amount of debt owed by the sovereign debtor, the bonds were issued at a discount, 
in terms of either principal or interest, from the loans with which they were exchanged.  In a typical 
restructuring under the Brady Plan, the bank advisory committee negotiated with the sovereign debtor to 
provide a menu of options, each of which was carefully tailored “to fit the varying regulatory and tax regimes 
of the banks involved, while remaining financially equivalent.”  Id. at 172.  The two most common options 
were par bonds, which were exchanged for the same principal amount of the loans but bearing a fixed interest 
rate below the prevailing rate in the market, and discount bonds, exchanged at a substantial discount from the 
principal amount of the loans but bearing an interest rate based on the market rate.  In addition to these two 
options, debt-equity swaps, which resulted in the banks holding a claim in the local currency that could be 
exchanged for shares of an entity subject to privatization, and cash repurchases of the loans, at substantial 
discounts from the principal amount of the loans, were also available.  The bonds usually had a maturity of 
thirty years, which was substantially longer than the maturity of the loans.  Id. 
The collectability of the bonds was enhanced through assistance provided by multilateral (and bilateral) 
agencies.  The most common form of enhancement related to the principal amount of the bonds.  Typically, a 
sovereign debtor purchased, with a combination of credit from the IMF and loans from the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as with its own reserves, thirty-year, zero-coupon Treasury 
bonds.  The Treasury bonds served to collateralize the bonds by ensuring full payment upon maturity.  The 
collateral for the principal of the bonds, however, was not available to the bondholders until the maturity of the 
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Although regulators initially viewed Brady Bonds as “appropriate only for 
a limited audience of speculative investors,” the high rates of return provided 
by the bonds attracted many investors.116  As the market for sovereign bonds 
grew,117 the governments of emerging market economies, particularly in Latin 
America, realized that they could access the bond markets for a significant 
portion of their financing needs and implemented strategies to do so.118 
One of the most important advantages of bonds is their flexibility as 
compared to loans from commercial banks.  Bonds have longer maturities than 
commercial loans, and the covenants in the agreements governing the bonds 
are generally less restrictive than the covenants contained in the agreements 
governing commercial loans.  In addition, bonds are easily listed and traded on 
the stock exchanges, and they have relatively simple clearing and settlement 
procedures.  Finally, the rating agencies assign credit ratings to sovereign 
bonds, providing investors with intercountry comparisons of the risks 
associated with the bonds.  This information, in turn, facilitates daily market 
pricing and trading, both of which serve to increase the attractiveness of 
sovereign bonds to investors.  As a result, during the 1990s, bonds issued to 
investors in the capital markets replaced loans from commercial banks as the 
 
loans.  A second common form of enhancement related to the interest accruing on the bonds. As in the case of 
the collateral for the principal amount of the bonds, Treasury securities were pledged to ensure that the interest 
on the bonds was paid.  Typically, this collateral was limited to the interest accruing on the bonds over a 
period of eighteen months (or perhaps two years), and the collateral was not available to bondholders for a 
period of eighteen months following a default on the bonds.  Finally, the bonds also contained covenants 
pursuant to which the sovereign debtors promised to refrain from requesting restructurings of the bonds.  Any 
request to restructure the bonds would thus constitute an event of default.  See id. (describing the menu of 
options offered under the Brady Plan); Power, supra note 41, at 2721-22 (describing the characteristics of the 
Brady Bonds). 
 116 McGovern, supra note 54, at 75.  In this way, the investors were similar to the purchasers of sovereign 
bonds in the 1920s. 
Many investors also tended to underestimate the risk of default on the bonds.  In miscalculating this 
risk, investors relied on a variety of factors, including the absence of defaults on sovereign bonds during the 
period from the early 1940s to the early 1990s and the exclusion of sovereign bonds from the restructurings of 
the 1980s.  See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 192-94 (describing the historical experience with sovereign bond 
defaults).  But see Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 10 (describing six defaults on marketable security debt, 
including bonds, between 1982 and 1990). 
 117 According to some estimates, between 1988 and 1995, twenty-one countries restructured their debt 
under the Brady Plan.  These restructurings involved a total of $170.2 billion of debt, and resulted in a 
reduction in total debt service costs of $76 million, reflecting an average of approximately 45% of the total.  
Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 INT’L LAW. 103, 106 (2003). 
 118 Initially, countries exchanged their Brady Bonds for Eurobonds, in both public exchanges and private 
exchanges.  Over time, countries issued Eurobonds to serve a variety of financing needs.  See Jane Brauer & 
Ryan McDuffy, The Decline of Brady Debt, MERRILL LYNCH EMERGING MARKETS RES., Apr. 5, 2004, at 1, 2. 
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main form of private capital flows to emerging market economies.119 
3. The Current Crisis 
By 1994, financial crises in several countries led to new crises involving 
sovereign debt.120  Many of these crises involved restructurings of sovereign 
bonds.  For example, in 1999 Pakistan restructured three Eurobonds with a 
face value of approximately $600 million; in 2000 Ecuador restructured Brady 
Bonds and Eurobonds with an aggregate face value of approximately $6.5 
billion and the Ukraine restructured four Eurobonds with a face value of 
approximately $2.3 billion; and in 2003 Uruguay restructured international 
bonds with a total face value of approximately $5.45 billion.121  And, of 
course, in 2001, Argentina defaulted on billions of dollars of bonds.122 
The recent restructurings of sovereign bonds have involved a variety of 
approaches.  In the cases of Pakistan, the Ukraine, and Uruguay, the 
restructurings were arranged prior to defaults on the bonds, while the case of 
 
 119 See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 190-92 (describing recent trends in financing in the emerging market 
economies).  In addition to Brady Bonds issued in connection with restructurings of commercial loans, 
sovereign debtors also issued new bonds, particularly Eurobonds.  See McGovern, supra note 54, at 78 
(describing the components of the market for sovereign bonds).  In 1993, Brady Bonds represented 27%, and 
Eurobonds represented 73%, of the bonds issued by the governments of the major emerging market 
economies.  In 2003, Eurobonds represented 88%, and Brady Bonds represented 12%, of these bonds.  See 
Brauer & McDuffy, supra note 118 (presenting data regarding issuances of Brady Bonds and Eurobonds). 
 120 The first of these crises, the Mexican Peso Crisis in 1994, the Asian Crisis in 1997, and the Russian 
Crisis in 1998, arose from financial crises in which the values of local currencies declined substantially against 
the dollar.  These crises were resolved with the significant assistance of creditor governments, notably the 
United States and Japan, as well as of multilateral agencies, including the IMF, and bilateral agencies, and, in 
the case of the Russian Crisis, the restructuring of loans made by commercial banks.  For a description of the 
Mexican Peso Crisis and the Russian Crisis, see Scott, supra note 117, at 106-07, 108.  See also RIEFFEL, 
supra note 38, at 198-211 (describing these crises).  Largely due to a reduction in the access of governments of 
emerging market economies to the international capital markets in the wake of the Russian Crisis, in 1999 
Brazil experienced a significant depreciation in the value of its currency.  This crisis was resolved through the 
provision of additional funds by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, as well 
as a rescheduling of (short-term) loans made by commercial banks.  See id. at 213-15 (describing the crisis in 
Brazil).  In 2000, Turkey experienced a substantial decrease in its foreign currency reserves, which was 
followed by a significant decline in the value of its currency as compared to the dollar.  This crisis was 
resolved with significant assistance from the IMF.  See id. at 215 (describing the crisis in Turkey); Scott, supra 
note 117, at 109-10 (same). 
 121 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, REVIEWING THE PROCESS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING WITHIN 
THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 3-4, tbl.1 (2003) (summarizing recent cases of sovereign debt 
restructurings), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/080103.pdf; Roubini & Setser, 
supra note 9, ch. 4, at 30, 47 (same). 
 122 See Barham, supra note 4 (describing the Argentine default); Lapper, supra note 4 (same). 
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Ecuador involved an extended period of default.123  With respect to the terms 
of the bonds, the restructurings of the bonds of Pakistan and Uruguay involved 
extensions of maturities, the restructuring of the bonds of the Ukraine involved 
extensions of the maturities together with reductions in the interest rates borne 
by the bonds, and in the case of Ecuador, the restructuring involved a reduction 
in the principal amount of the outstanding bonds of approximately twenty-
seven percent.124  While all of these restructurings involved exchange offers, 
Pakistan and Uruguay relied on ad hoc consultations with bondholders to 
apprise them of the terms of the offer and to encourage them to accept the 
offer, the Ukraine engaged in an extensive effort to contact bondholders, and 
Ecuador essentially declined to speak with bondholders.125 
C. Creditor Heterogeneity and the Divergence of Interests 
The diversity in sovereign bond restructurings, in many ways, reflects the 
diversity among investors in sovereign bonds.  Sovereign bonds are held by 
large commercial banks, smaller commercial banks, local banks, investment 
banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, retail funds, hedge 
funds, nonfinancial companies, and retail investors.126  Moreover, the extent to 
which these various investors hold bonds issued by any particular country 
differs markedly across countries and issues of bonds.127 
 
 123 Roubini & Setser, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 30. 
 124 Id. at 31. 
 125 INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 121, tbl.1; see also RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 211-13 (describing 
the restructurings of the bonds of Pakistan, the Ukraine, and Ecuador); Michael Peterson, Small Investors Flex 
Their Muscles, EUROMONEY, Oct. 2000, at 20. 
 126 See McGovern, supra note 54, at 77 (describing the various types of holders of sovereign bonds).  The 
diversity of the investors in the Eurobond market has encouraged the development of new instruments.  In 
addition to bonds, structured debt, collateralized bond obligations, and total-return swaps have all been created 
to satisfy the regulatory constraints imposed on investors.  In addition, derivative instruments allow banks and 
hedge funds to enhance returns while dispersing risk.  Id. at 78-79 (describing the variety of instruments traded 
in the market). 
 127 For example, in the case of Pakistan, approximately one-third of the bonds subject to the restructuring 
were held by domestic residents and the remaining bonds were held by financial institutions and retail 
investors in the Middle East.  See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 121, at 3-4, tbl.1 (summarizing recent 
cases of sovereign debt restructurings).  For Ecuador, the bonds were widely held by institutional investors in 
New York and London.  Id.  For the Ukraine, three of the bonds were held by a small number of investment 
banks and hedge funds, and the fourth bond was widely held by retail investors in Europe.  Id.  For Uruguay, 
the dollar-denominated bonds were widely held by institutional investors in the United States, but more than 
one-half of all the bonds were held by domestic investors, principally retail investors.  Id.  For Argentina, of 
the approximately $100 billion principal amount of debt subject to the (current) restructuring, approximately 
$50 billion is held by Argentine financial institutions, approximately $20 billion is held by retail investors in 
Europe, approximately $3 billion is held by retail investors in Japan, and the remaining $27 billion is held by 
institutional investors in the United States.  Id. 
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These diverse investors, like the commercial banks that held sovereign debt 
in the 1970s, differ in their exposure, in the regulatory environments they 
confront, in the extent of their relationships with sovereign debtors, and in their 
involvement in the international capital markets.  The level of heterogeneity 
among these investors, however, is greater than the differences among 
commercial banks.  As a general matter, commercial banks follow a common 
business plan.  They make loans to borrowers and hold cash deposits.  They 
expect to make profits from the spreads between the interest rates charged on 
the loans and the interest rates paid on the deposits, as well as from fees for 
their services.128  Investors in sovereign bonds, on the other hand, are engaged 
in a wide variety of businesses, and they purchase sovereign bonds for many 
different reasons.  For example, most mutual funds strive to create a diversified 
portfolio of assets and so they invest only a small portion of their funds in 
sovereign bonds.129  Hedge funds typically purchase relatively large positions 
in sovereign bonds.130  Retail investors, in contrast, often hold sovereign bonds 
as part of a long-term investment strategy, such as to provide income during 
their retirement years.131  Moreover, the institutions and individuals holding 
the bonds of any particular sovereign debtor continually change as the bonds 
are traded in the market.132 
As the group of investors holding sovereign debt has become more diverse, 
vulture funds have achieved particular notoriety.  Vulture funds typically trade 
in distressed debt—purchasing bonds at prices that represent substantial 
discounts from their face values.133  In making these purchases, vulture funds 
typically seek short-term gains, either through the restructuring process or by 
 
 128 See RIEFFEL, supra note 38, at 38 (describing the activities of commercial banks). 
 129 See id. at 39 (describing activities of investment funds); see also INV. CO. INST., MUTUAL FUND FACT 
BOOK 3 (43d ed. 2003) (describing diversification strategy of mutual funds). 
 130 HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS 25-36 (2000).   
 131 See, e.g., Argentina and the IMF: Which Is the Victim?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2004, at 63, 64 (noting 
that purchasers of sovereign bonds issued by Argentina include pensioners living in Italy); Suzanne Miller, 
Lessons from Argentina, BANKER, Feb. 1, 2002 (describing the retail investors who purchased sovereign bonds 
issued by Argentina as ranging “from dentists in Belgium to housewives in Japan”). 
 132 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1005-06 (noting the constantly changing identities of sovereign bondholders). 
 133 See, e.g., Deepak Gopinath, The Debt-Crisis Crisis, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 2002, at 36, 38 
(describing the opinion of analysts that Argentina’s “bonds, trading at the equivalent of 20 cents on the dollar, 
are still too expensive as a vulture play.  The target: 12 cents [on the dollar]”).  For a general description of the 
strategies used by vulture funds, see ROSENBERG, supra note 130.  For a more detailed description of the role 
of vulture funds in the restructuring of sovereign bonds, see Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, 
Declawing the Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 253, 254, 262-64 (2003). 
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holding out and seeking additional payments from the debtors through 
negotiated transactions or as a result of litigation.134   
Investors in sovereign bonds also differ significantly in their levels of 
exposure to the risk of default on the bonds.  The value of the bonds held in 
each portfolio as compared to the total value of the assets in the portfolio 
varies across the various types of investors as well as within the various classes 
of investors.  Some investors may experience bankruptcy upon a default on the 
bonds, others may only experience a small loss.135 
Due to the growth of the secondary market, investors purchase sovereign 
bonds in the market at different prices.  Unlike the restructurings of the 1930s 
in which investors had purchased bonds from banks at equivalent prices, and 
unlike the restructurings of the 1980s in which most of the commercial banks 
made loans to the sovereign debtors through the syndication process, investors 
today may purchase bonds at substantial discounts from their face values.  
These differences in prices create substantial disparities among bondholders.  
For example, retail investors who purchase bonds at the time of their issuance, 
at prices near the face values of the bonds, are likely to be reluctant to accept 
the terms of a restructuring that substantially reduce the principal amounts of 
the bonds.136  Other investors, notably vulture funds, who purchase the bonds 
once the sovereign debtor begins to experience severe distress, pay a much 
lower price for the bonds and so may be willing to accept restructuring terms 
that impose significant reductions to the principal amounts of the bonds.137  In 
between these two extremes, institutional investors may be willing to accept 
limited reductions to the principal amounts of the bonds in a restructuring, 
depending upon the magnitude of the losses or gains they have sustained.138 
 
 134 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 14 (describing the strategic behavior of vulture funds). 
 135 See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 54, at 79-80 (describing the techniques banks and investment funds 
use to minimize the risk associated with investing in sovereign bonds); Richard Lapper, Creditors Unite to 
Seek Better Deal on Argentine Debt, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003, at 3 (describing the small investors from 
Japan, Italy, Germany, and several smaller European countries as among the worst affected by the current 
crisis in Argentina). 
 136 See Felix Salmon, A United Stand for Retail Bond Investors, EUROMONEY, June 2003, at 152, 153 
(describing retail investors as “want[ing] to get their money back”). 
 137 See Collective Indecision, EUROMONEY, Nov. 2002 (“[B]ondholders are not like banks holding 
syndicated loans . . . .  A hedge fund that bought at 25 [cents on the dollar] yesterday might be very happy with 
a work-out that would be worth 35 [cents on the dollar] next week; a retail investor who bought at par seven 
years ago would probably reject such an offer as out of hand.”). 
 138 See Salmon, supra note 136, at 153 (describing these investors as “want[ing] to maximize the present 
value of their paper”).  The purchase of sovereign bonds in the market at different prices also engenders 
disagreements among investors as to the appropriate measure of the discount to be included in a restructuring 
of the bonds.  In the event bondholders are able to reach an agreement regarding the appropriate discount, or 
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Investors in sovereign bonds also face significantly different regulatory 
environments.  Banks and other institutional investors record the values of 
their portfolios of sovereign bonds at market prices, often daily and certainly 
monthly or quarterly.139  Retail investors, however, typically do not perform 
this exercise.  By “marking to market,” banks and other institutional investors 
record their gains and losses almost as they occur. 140  Retail investors typically 
record gains and losses only upon sales of bonds.  Because the values of their 
portfolios already reflect the losses due to financial distress, banks and other 
institutional investors may elect to exit a restructuring by selling their bonds in 
the market, rather than holding the bonds and working to complete the 
restructuring process.141  These sales further depress the price and create losses 
for other investors, including retail investors. Moreover, as secondary trading 
leads to shifts in the ownership of the distressed debt, it hinders efforts to reach 
consensus among the bondholders. 
Like the large commercial banks that guided the restructurings of the 
1980s, only large investors, particularly commercial banks and investment 
banks, have relationships with sovereign debtors that they are eager to use as a 
basis for generating additional business.142  These investors are also the most 
likely repeat players in the international capital markets with the resulting 
expectations that they will work with one another in a variety of settings.143  As 
a result, these investors may support restructuring plans that are unacceptable 
 
“haircut,” to be suffered in a restructuring, they may disagree as to the point from which the discount is to be 
calculated.  Rather than the principal amounts of the bonds, investors who have purchased bonds at prices 
equal to the face amounts may argue that the haircut should be applied with respect to the prices at which 
investors purchased their bonds.  See Angela Pruitt, Argentina’s Debt Workout Is Complex, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
12, 2003 (reporting the comments of a lawyer who has represented parties in restructurings that “retail 
investors who bought Argentina’s bonds at 100% of face value aren’t going to agree to take the same losses as 
a vulture fund that scooped up the paper at distressed levels”), available at 2003 WL 3961535. 
 139 See McGovern, supra note 54, at 79 (describing this practice). 
 140 See id. (describing the consequences of this practice). 
 141 Id. 
 142 See Felix Salmon, Argentina’s Messy Debt Exchange, EUROMONEY, Dec. 2001, at 58, 60 (quoting a 
senior banker at a large bank as stating: “Our firm has a much greater stake in Argentina’s prosperity than in 
Argentina going off the rails.  So, all things being equal, we’re going to want to help them.”); Anne O. 
Krueger, The Evolution of Emerging Market Capital Flows: Why We Need to Look Again at Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, Address at the Economics Society Dinner (Jan. 21, 2002) (describing most investors in 
sovereign bonds as lacking long-term relationships with sovereign debtors), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ 
speeches/2002/012102.htm; Roubini & Setser, supra note 9, ch. 4, at 33 (describing the benefits of these 
relationships as including “fees and commissions . . . from ongoing and future underwriting of a country’s 
bonds and the franchise value of their commercial banking operations in the debtor country”). 
 143 Smaller investors, particularly retail investors, simply purchase sovereign bonds as part of their 
personal investment strategies, without any expectation of participating in the sovereign debt market in any 
other capacity. 
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to smaller investors, notably retail investors.144  In particular, large institutional 
investors may be willing to suffer a greater loss in a restructuring to solidify 
relationships with a sovereign debtor and to establish a reputation for success 
in restructuring sovereign bonds, both of which are likely to lead to future 
business opportunities and future revenues.145  Retail investors, like the smaller 
commercial banks that participated in the restructurings of the 1980s, invest in 
sovereign bonds only for the returns, not for the prospect of building future 
business relationships. As a result, they are unwilling to trade repayment of the 
bonds for future business opportunities.146 
Importantly, investors in sovereign bonds, like investors in the 1920s, lack 
an effective means of reaching consensus regarding the terms of restructurings.  
Although these investors generally agree on a policy of uniform treatment of 
all bondholders,147 they typically cannot reach agreement on restructuring 
terms.  Moreover, unlike the restructurings of the 1980s, today’s creditors lack 
a mechanism to impose their preferences on other investors.148 
The absence of widespread support for the terms of a proposed 
 
 144 In this way, the large institutional investors, many of which have sold sovereign bonds to retail 
investors, are similar to the banks that sold sovereign bonds to individual investors during the 1920s.  Upon the 
advent of a financial crisis affecting the bonds, the large institutional investors, like the banks, have a greater 
interest in preserving and enhancing their relationships with sovereign debtors than in protecting the interests 
of small investors. 
 145 Some commentators have suggested that sovereign debtors have an interest in proposing restructuring 
terms that are most favorable to large institutional investors, as these investors are likely to purchase sovereign 
bonds in the future, while retail investors, having incurred significant losses in the restructuring, are unlikely to 
include sovereign bonds in their portfolios in the future.  See Salmon, supra note 136, at 152 (describing the 
reasons sovereign debtors may favor institutional investors over retail investors in restructurings). 
 146 In the case of Argentina, concern for restructuring terms that favor large institutional investors to the 
detriment of small investors has led to the formation of the Argentine Bond Restructuring Agency to represent 
the interests of retail investors.  See id. (describing the formation of the Argentine Bond Restructuring 
Agency); see also Deepak Gopinath, Default Line, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 2003, at 29, 29-30 
(describing concerns regarding unfair treatment of retail investors in the Argentine restructuring).  These 
concerns have led Felix Salmon to propose that retail investors be “taught not to buy” sovereign bonds as a 
means of “get[ting] rid of the entire class of retail investors to as great a degree as is practicable.”  Felix 
Salmon, Stop Selling Bonds to Retail Investors, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2004). 
 147 See Salmon, supra note 142, at 58 (stating than “[i]f bondholders are concerned about one issue above 
all others, it’s that of equal treatment”). 
 148 See Gopinath, supra note 133, at 37 (“[R]esolving debt crises has already become a more complicated 
tactical proposition than it was in the notorious Latin American default-a-month era of the 1980s.  Then 
commercial banks were . . . susceptible to government suasion.  They could be coerced and cajoled into 
undertaking elaborate debt restructurings that kept countries afloat.  Now the vast bulk of emerging-markets 
debt is held by widely dispersed and difficult to identify bondholders who don’t readily kowtow to government 
officials.”); Krueger, supra note 142 (describing most sovereign bond investors as not “fear[ing] the arm-
twisting of regulators”). 
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restructuring contributes to the decision of some bondholders to hold out and 
to refuse to support the restructuring.  These holdout bondholders may instead 
pursue their claims against the sovereign debtor in court.  We next explore the 
developing role of litigation in the enforcement of claims against sovereign 
debtors. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
At the same time that the identities and interests of creditors have become 
more heterogeneous, increasing the likelihood of holdouts, the ability of 
holdout creditors to pursue litigation remedies has also increased.  Courts in 
the United States have rejected the various defenses sovereign debtors have 
raised in suits brought by creditors, providing creditors with unprecedented 
access to litigation. 
In the restructurings of the 1930s, litigation was not a viable option for 
holdout creditors.  The agreements governing the bonds generally did provide 
protections for the holders of the bonds, including a pledge of the good faith 
and credit of the issuing government149 and security clauses assigning specific 
sources of governmental revenues or specific governmental properties to fulfill 
servicing requirements.150  Upon default, however, these contractual 
protections provided little real protection to the holders of the bonds.  The 
sovereign debtors, with the powers and rights of nations, could not be sued 
without their consent.151 
The power of the sovereign immunity defense to block creditor litigation in 
the United States was subsequently significantly reduced.  In 1952, the 
Executive Branch of the United States adopted a restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity, which was announced in the “Tate Letter.”152  The restrictive theory 
provided that sovereigns retained “immunity for their public or sovereign acts, 
 
 149 Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 61. 
 150 BORCHARD, supra note 31, at 83-89. 
 151 See Turkmani v. Republic of Bolivia, 193 F. Supp. 2d 165, 170 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Since the founding of 
the nation to the latter half of the twentieth century, foreign sovereigns enjoyed absolute immunity from suit in 
United States courts.”); Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 336 (stating that “[c]reditors had essentially 
no enforceable rights [during the 1930s], primarily because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity”). 
 152 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting Attorney General 
Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984-85 (1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of 
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 712-13 (1976); see Turkmani, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 170-71 
(describing Tate Letter). 
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but could be sued in U.S. courts for their commercial or private acts.”153 
Congress codified the Executive Branch’s theory in the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).154  Thereafter, in Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, Inc.155 the Supreme Court held that issuing sovereign bonds 
constituted commercial activity within the meaning of the FSIA.156  The Court 
further held that Argentina’s rescheduling of its bonds, which involved the 
payment of interest through New York-based accounts, had a sufficiently 
“direct effect” within the United States to justify the exercise of jurisdiction 
under the FSIA.157 
Following the adoption of the FSIA, courts widely interpreted the issuance 
of public debt as commercial activity for the purposes of sovereign immunity 
analysis.  This interpretation significantly reduced the viability of a sovereign 
immunity defense.158  At the same time, sovereign debtors increasingly waived 
their sovereign immunity and explicitly consented to the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts.159  The predictable consequence of these developments was an effort by 
creditors to enforce their claims against sovereign debtors through litigation. 
The first of these efforts occurred in the early 1980s.  Similar to other 
emerging market economies in Latin America, in 1981 Costa Rica experienced 
a shortage of foreign currency with which to pay its external debt, including 
loans owed to commercial banks.160  In an effort to alleviate this crisis, in July 
of 1981, the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa Rica passed a 
 
 153 Turkmani, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 171. 
 154 Id.  A plurality of the Supreme Court had announced, six months prior to the adoption of the FSIA, 
that the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity would not prevent subjecting a foreign sovereign to suit for 
“participation in the marketplace in the manner of a private citizen or corporation.”  Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (citing Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698-705). 
 155 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 156 Id. at 614-15. 
 157 Id. at 618-19. 
 158 The FSIA can still limit plaintiffs’ attempts to attach assets located in the United States pursuant to a 
foreign judgment.  See Corzo v. Banco Central de Reserva Del Peru, 243 F.3d 519 (9th Cir. 2001) (refusing to 
exercise jurisdiction over suit to enforce Peruvian judgment and concluding that submission to jurisdiction in 
foreign court did not amount to waiver of sovereign immunity in the United States). 
 159 See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 676 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(describing Banco Nacional as an instrumentality of the government of Costa Rica and recounting its waiver of 
“any right or immunity from legal proceedings including suit judgment and execution on grounds of 
sovereignty which it or its property may now or hereafter enjoy”); see also Proyecfin de Venez., S.A. v. Banco 
Industrial de Venez., S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 397 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding waiver of sovereign immunity in loan 
agreement); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. People’s Republic of Congo, 729 F. Supp. 936, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(same). 
 160 See Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 29 (describing the financial crisis in Costa Rica). 
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resolution prohibiting all state-owned entities from paying interest or principal 
owing on debts to foreign creditors and denominated in foreign currency.161 
The inability of a syndicate of commercial banks to obtain repayment of a 
$40 million loan made to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (Banco Nacional) led 
the syndicate to seek an order of attachment in New York state court.162  Banco 
Nacional first defaulted in the state court proceeding.163  Then, after the 
syndicate obtained an order of attachment for Banco Nacional’s property in 
New York and successfully attached $800,000 in assets, Banco Nacional 
entered an appearance, removed the action to federal court, and moved to 
vacate the order of attachment on the grounds of sovereign immunity.164  The 
Second Circuit held that the foreign state had explicitly waived in writing all 
sovereign immunity and upheld the attachment.165 
When the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, Banco Nacional tried an 
alternative approach, arguing that events in Costa Rica constituted a defense to 
repayment under the act of state doctrine.166  The court held that the act of state 
doctrine precludes U.S. courts from inquiring into “the validity of foreign 
seizures only when there is ‘a taking of property within its own territory by a 
foreign sovereign government.’”167 The court held that, in this case, the act of 
state doctrine did not apply because the property that was the subject of the 
litigation was located in the United States, not in Costa Rica.  “[T]he situs of 
the debt owed by Banco Nacional was in this nation at the time that the foreign 
currency decrees were enacted.”168  Finding that the act of state doctrine was 
the only issue on which the parties disagreed, the court ordered summary 
judgment in favor of the syndicate.169 
Although the court was ready to enter judgment against it, Banco Nacional 
moved for reargument in order to put forward a third defense, arguing that 
 
 161 See Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(describing the moratorium); Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 29 (discussing the response to the crisis in Costa 
Rica); see also Truglia et al., supra note 11, at 11 (describing events surrounding the crisis in Costa Rica). 
 162 Libra Bank, 676 F.2d at 48. 
 163 Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Libra Bank, 676 F.2d at 50. 
 166 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 876. 
 167 Id. at 877 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1968)). 
 168 Id. at 881.  The court noted that the loan agreement provided for the application of New York law and 
that all payments under the agreement were to be made in New York.  Id. at 881-82. 
 169 Id. at 896-97. 
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Article VIII, section 2(b) of the IMF Bretton Woods Agreement170 prohibited 
enforcement of the loan agreement.171  The Bretton Woods Agreement 
provides that “[e]xchange contracts which involve the currency of any member 
and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member 
maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be 
unenforceable in the territories of any member.”172  The court rejected this 
third defense.  In reaching this result, the court considered two competing 
interpretations of the term “exchange contract,” a broad interpretation and a 
narrow one.173  Reasoning that a definition of the term sufficiently expansive to 
include loan agreements would “[do] violence to the text of the section,” the 
court opted for the narrow definition.174  The court therefore held that “a 
contract to borrow United States currency, which requires repayment in United 
States currency, and which designates New York as the situs of repayment, is 
not an exchange contract within the meaning of Article VIII, section 2(b)” and 
that the Bretton Woods Agreement was therefore inapplicable.175 
The Libra Bank litigation illustrates both the growing potential of creditor 
litigation as a remedy against a defaulting sovereign debtor and the limitations 
of the remedy.  The decisions recognized the validity of the syndicate’s 
contractual claim and rejected a variety of defenses.  Thus, the decisions made 
clear that enforcement litigation is a viable option for creditors.  At the same 
time, the outcome of the litigation demonstrates the shortcomings of the 
option.  Although at the time of the decision the syndicate was owed 
approximately $35 million in principal and interest, Banco Nacional only held 
about $2.5 million in assets in New York, of which the syndicate was only able 
to attach $800,000.176 
A second case arising out of the financial crisis in Costa Rica, Allied Bank 
International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago,177 introduced the prospect 
 
 170 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 
U.N.T.S. 39 (as amended). 
 171 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 896. 
 172 Id. at 897. 
 173 See id. (describing broad and narrow interpretations). 
 174 Id. at 899 (citations omitted).  The court noted that other courts had adopted the narrow interpretation 
and that the broader view had been supported primarily by commentators.  Id. 
 175 Id. at 900. 
 176 Id. at 882; see Joseph B. Frumkin, Comment, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign 
Defaults on United States Bank Loans: A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 493-94 
(1985) (arguing that the limited prospect of satisfying the judgment through assets located in New York should 
have led the court to dismiss the litigation under the act of state doctrine). 
 177 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) [hereinafter Allied Bank], aff’d, 733 F.2d 23, 1984 U.S. App. 
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of holdout litigation.  Allied Bank International (Allied Bank), as agent for a 
syndicate of thirty-nine commercial banks that had participated in a loan to 
three banks wholly owned by Costa Rica, filed suit in federal court based on 
the failure of the debtors to make payments required by the loan.178  As in 
Libra Bank, the failure to make the payments was a consequence of the 
imposition of the exchange controls prohibiting the servicing of obligations 
owed to foreign creditors.179  The district court, relying on the act of state 
doctrine, which bars the courts of one country from sitting in judgment on the 
acts of the government of another, done in its own territory, denied Allied 
Bank’s motion for summary judgment.180 
While the case was pending before the district court, the parties entered 
into negotiations to restructure the loan.181  Thirty-eight members of the bank 
syndicate were able to reach an agreement with the debtors to restructure the 
loan, but one member of the syndicate, Fidelity Union Trust Company of New 
Jersey (Fidelity), refused to ratify the agreement or to participate in the 
restructuring plan.182  Allied Bank subsequently appealed the district court 
decision on behalf of Fidelity, the sole holdout creditor.183  The Second Circuit 
initially agreed with the district court that the suit should not be heard, 
dismissing it on grounds of comity.184 
Apparently, the New York financial community reacted adversely to the 
decision, fearing that New York would lose its status as a center for 
multinational financial transactions if New York courts were unwilling to 
enforce loan agreements against sovereign debtors.185  In any event, the court 
subsequently agreed to rehear the case.  The Justice Department submitted an 
amicus brief explaining that, although its position was to encourage the 
cooperative restructuring of sovereign debt, this position was “grounded in the 
understanding that, while parties may agree to renegotiate conditions of 
 
LEXIS 23237 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam) [hereinafter Allied Bank I], rev’d on rehearing, 757 F.2d 516 (2d 
Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Allied Bank II]. 
 178 Allied Bank, 566 F. Supp. at 1442. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 1444.  Several weeks later, the action was dismissed by agreement of the parties after they 
stipulated that no factual issues remained with respect to the act of state doctrine.  Allied Bank I, 1984 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 23237, at *5. 
 181 Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 519. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Allied Bank I, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 23237, at *12. 
 185 William W. Park, Legal Policy Conflicts in International Banking, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067, 1075-76 
(1989). 
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payment, the underlying obligations to pay nevertheless remain valid and 
enforceable.”186  The Justice Department explained that the imposition of 
unilateral exchange controls by Costa Rica was therefore inconsistent with 
U.S. policy.187 
Fidelity’s position was also supported by the New York Clearing House 
Association (Clearing House), which filed an amicus brief.188  The Clearing 
House’s position was seemingly motivated by a desire to establish 
unambiguous legal precedent for enforcing the rights of commercial banks and 
other creditors against sovereign debtors.189  A judicial decision favorable to 
the claim, although detrimental to their general approach to restructuring plans, 
would provide bank advisory committees (and other commercial banks) with 
additional leverage in negotiating agreements with sovereign debtors and in 
developing restructuring plans in future crises.190 
Upon rehearing, the Second Circuit concluded that the act of state doctrine 
did not bar the lawsuit because the situs of the debt at issue was New York, not 
Costa Rica.  As the court explained: 
The Costa Rican banks conceded jurisdiction in New York and they 
agreed to pay the debt in New York City in United States dollars. 
Allied [Bank], the designated syndicate agent, is located in the 
United States, specifically in New York; some of the negotiations 
between the parties took place in the United States.  The United 
States has an interest in maintaining New York’s status as one of the 
foremost commercial centers in the world.  Further, New York is the 
international clearing center for United States dollars. In addition to 
other international activities, United States banks lend billions of 
dollars to foreign debtors each year.  The United States has an 
interest in ensuring that creditors entitled to payment in the United 
States in United States dollars under contracts subject to the 
jurisdiction of United States courts may assume that, except under 
the most extraordinary circumstances, their rights will be determined 
 
 186 Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 519. 
 187 Brief of Amici Curiae United States at 6-7, 18, Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d 516 (No. 83-7714). 
 188 Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 30.  The Clearing House was comprised of twelve large commercial 
banks located in the United States.  Many of these banks had portfolios of loans to sovereign debtors in which 
the total amount of the loans exceeded the total value of their assets.  As a result, these banks were deeply 
involved in the restructuring process, and they worked diligently to avoid defaults on the loans.  See id. 
(describing the Clearing House). 
 189 See id. at 30-31 (discussing the likely motivations of the members of the Clearing House). 
 190 Id. 
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in accordance with recognized principles of contract law.191 
The court went on to reject the argument that principles of comity should bar 
the suit, reasoning that “[t]he Costa Rican government’s unilateral attempt to 
repudiate private, commercial obligations is inconsistent with the orderly 
resolution of international debt problems.  It is similarly contrary to the 
interests of the United States, a major source of private international credit.”192  
The court then granted Allied Bank’s motion for summary judgment.193 
The two Costa Rica cases thus opened the door to creditor litigation in 
general and holdout litigation in particular.  Moreover, the positions of the 
Justice Department and the Clearing House, as articulated in Allied Bank II, 
suggest a clear relationship between the availability of judicial enforcement of 
loan agreements against defaulting sovereigns and the functioning of the 
sovereign debt market.  In particular, as the amici observed, even if voluntary 
restructurings are in the interests of both creditors and debtors, judicial 
enforcement gives creditors valuable leverage to bring to the negotiating table. 
As sovereign debt litigation continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
courts adhered to the approach in the Costa Rica cases.  In particular, courts 
found that neither international political considerations nor the plaintiff’s 
unwillingness to participate in a voluntary restructuring operated to bar 
recovery.  Instead, the courts evidenced a repeated willingness both to take 
jurisdiction and to resolve the cases promptly upon motions for summary 
judgment.  A.I. Credit Corp. v. Government of Jamaica194 is a typical case.  
Following three reschedulings of its debt in 1978, 1979, and 1981, Jamaica 
entered into a fourth rescheduling in 1984.195  Like the previous reschedulings, 
this one did not prove workable, and almost immediately Jamaica and its 
lenders entered into a fifth and then a sixth rescheduling.196  A.I. Credit Corp. 
(AICO), which had received approximately $10 million in debt, plus interest, 
through an assignment effected after the 1984 restructuring, did not participate 
in the fifth and sixth reschedulings and instead sued for payment based on the 
terms of the fourth rescheduling.197  The court observed that although the 
reschedulings affected debts owed to some 113 financial institutions, AICO 
 
 191 Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 521-22. 
 192 Id. at 522. 
 193 Id. at 523. 
 194 666 F. Supp. 629, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
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was the only party to bring suit.198  The court found that the terms of the 1984 
agreement explicitly provided AICO with an individual right to bring suit to 
enforce the agreement.199  The court then concluded that there was no 
outstanding issue of material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff.200 
Sovereign debtors, however, have not been entirely powerless in these 
lawsuits.  In particular, carefully drafted debt instruments have enabled 
defendants to block holdout litigation.  An example can be found in the 
litigation by CIBC Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Limited (CIBC Bank), 
on behalf of the Dart family, against Banco Central do Brasil (Banco do 
Brasil).201  Brazil negotiated a Multi-Year Deposit Facility Agreement 
(MYDFA) as part of the restructuring of its debt in the 1980s.202  The MYDFA 
provided, among its terms, that the debt could be accelerated upon an event of 
default only if more than fifty percent of the creditors, calculated by amount of 
debt holdings, voted to accelerate.203  Just a year after the MYDFA was 
consummated, Brazil was unable to meet its obligations to creditors and sought 
to restructure the MYDFA debt pursuant to the Brady Plan.  The Dart family 
refused to go along with the new restructuring and instead filed suit seeking 
both to obtain the accrued and unpaid interest on their approximately $1.4 
billion of MYDFA debt and to accelerate the entire principal amount of the 
MYDFA.204 
CIBC Bank’s effort to accelerate was blocked by Brazil’s careful approach 
to the new restructuring.  In connection with the restructuring, Brazilian 
officials ordered Banco do Brasil, a Brazilian commercial bank fifty-one 
percent owned by the Brazilian Treasury, to retain $1.6 billion of MYDFA 
debt rather than converting all of its holdings to Brady Bonds.  By retaining a 
majority of the outstanding MYDFA debt, Banco do Brasil was able to prevent 
CIBC Bank from obtaining a majority vote in favor of accelerating the debt.205 
In the litigation that followed, the court rejected Banco do Brasil’s defenses 
of improper assignment and champerty, yet it upheld Brazil’s move to block 
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 199 Id. at 631-32. 
 200 Id. at 633. 
 201 CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 202 Id. at 1107. 
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acceleration of the debt.  The court observed that the plain terms of the contract 
required a majority vote to accelerate and that CIBC Bank did not hold a 
majority of the outstanding debt.206  Moreover, the court refused to imply an 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in order to invalidate Banco do 
Brasil’s actions to block the acceleration.207  Significantly, the court observed 
that the implied covenants sought by CIBC Bank would have the effect of 
substantially altering the rights of the parties and would impair the ability of 
debtors and creditors “to order their relationships through contractual debt 
agreements.”208  Indeed, the court expressly acknowledged that the provisions 
allowed Banco do Brasil to retain and vote its share of the MYDFA debt in 
order to hinder another creditor’s attempt to accelerate that debt.209  The 
consequence of the court’s ruling was to permit the litigation seeking accrued 
and unpaid interest to proceed, but to bar acceleration.  This had the effect of 
reducing CIBC Bank’s claimed damages from more than $1.4 billion to only 
$60 million. 
Sovereign debtors in more recent cases have attempted to raise additional 
defenses.  In virtually every case, however, courts have rejected these defenses 
in favor of protecting the enforceability of sovereign debt obligations through 
litigation.  Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru210 involved 
debt originally borrowed by Banco Popular del Peru (Banco Popular) from the 
Mellon Bank of Pittsburgh.  The debt, which was guaranteed by the 
government of Peru, was subsequently sold to Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. 
(Pravin) in the secondary market at a deep discount.211  In addition to arguing 
that the case should be dismissed based on principles of comity, Banco Popular 
and Peru argued that the assignment of the debt to the plaintiff was invalid, 
barring the plaintiff’s claim.212  The Second Circuit rejected these arguments 
and awarded summary judgment to Pravin in the amount of $2,161,539.78 plus 
interest.213 
On the issue of comity, the court expanded on its analysis in Allied Bank.214  
The court identified two competing U.S. policies implicated by sovereign debt 
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litigation.  On the one hand, the United States encourages the resolution of 
foreign debt restructurings through Brady Plan negotiations.215  On the other 
hand, the United States has a strong interest in ensuring the continued 
enforceability of foreign debts owed to U.S. lenders.216  The court concluded 
that the second interest limited the first so as to require that creditor 
participation in restructurings be voluntary, supported by the backdrop of the 
creditor’s continued right to enforce the debt.217  Accordingly, the court found 
that principles of comity did not preclude a grant of summary judgment.218 
The court also considered the defendants’ argument that the assignment of 
the debt to Pravin was improper.  The terms of the debt instrument authorized 
the creditor to assign its interest in the instrument “to any financial 
institution.”219  Peru argued that this language should be interpreted to preclude 
an assignment to Pravin, which was not a bank.220  The court rejected this 
argument, explaining that, under New York law, only express limitations on 
assignability are enforceable.221  The court then concluded that the language in 
question permitted assignment of the debt to financial institutions but did not 
explicitly limit assignments only to those entities.222  Accordingly, it concluded 
that the assignment was valid whether or not Pravin was properly characterized 
as a financial institution.223 
Perhaps the best known instance of creditor litigation is the successful suit 
by Elliott Associates, L.P. (Elliott), a vulture fund, against Peru.224  Elliott 
purchased in the secondary market approximately $20 million principal 
amount of letter agreements issued by Banco de la Nacion and Banco Popular 
and guaranteed by Peru for approximately $11 million, slightly more than 
fifty-five percent of the face value of the debt.225  At the time Elliott purchased 
the letter agreements, Peru was in the process of negotiating a restructuring of 
its debt under the Brady Plan.226  Elliott refused to participate in the 
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restructuring and demanded full payment of the letter agreements.227  When 
Peru refused to pay, Elliott sued in New York Supreme Court, from which the 
case was subsequently removed to federal court.228  Although the district court 
originally dismissed the suit, holding that it violated the prohibition on 
champerty under section 489 of the New York Judiciary Law,229 the decision 
was overturned by the Second Circuit.230 
As in Pravin, Peru argued that the assignment of debt to Elliott was 
invalid.231  The district court, relying on the Pravin decision, rejected this 
argument.232  Peru also argued that Elliott purchased the debt “with the intent 
and for the purpose of bringing” litigation, thereby rendering the purchase a 
violation of the prohibition of champerty imposed by the New York Judiciary 
Law.233  The court dismissed the suit, finding that Elliott had, indeed, violated 
the statute.234  The Second Circuit, however, reversed.235  After an extensive 
review of the history both of the New York statute and the underlying 
principles of champerty, the court concluded that the “acquisition of a debt 
with intent to bring suit against the debtor is not a violation of the statute where 
. . . the primary purpose of the suit is the collection of the debt acquired.”236  
Moreover, the court found that Elliott’s primary purpose in acquiring the debt 
was to be paid in full, and that any intent to litigate was merely “incidental and 
contingent.”237  Upon remand, the district court granted summary judgment, 
awarding Elliott more than $55 million.238 
Like the syndicate of commercial banks in Libra Bank (and most creditors 
that successfully sue sovereign debtors), Elliott then confronted the principal 
limitation of the litigation remedy: the inability to enforce its judgment.239  For 
any creditor, the utility of a judgment depends upon its access to attachable 
assets.  Defaulting sovereigns, however, rarely leave assets in jurisdictions in 
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which attachment is possible.  A judgment is unlikely to be enforced in a 
sovereign’s own courts, within whose jurisdiction most of the sovereign’s 
assets are located.  Moreover, contractual waivers of sovereign immunity may 
not enable the creditor to obtain orders of attachment in other jurisdictions.  
Elliott, for example, made several attempts to collect its judgment in New 
York by seeking orders of attachment against financial intermediaries, but 
those efforts were unsuccessful. 
Consequently, Elliott took another approach.  Peru was about to make the 
first interest payment on the Brady Bonds that it had issued in connection with 
the restructuring of its debt.  This payment involved the transfer of funds from 
Peru to the Euroclear System, in Belgium, which would then make payment to 
individual bondholders.  Arguing that the pari passu clause in the debt 
agreement precluded Peru from making payments on some of its debt contracts 
and not others, Elliott sued in a Brussels court to obtain an order of attachment 
on the transferred funds.240  The court accepted Elliott’s interpretation of the 
pari passu clause and ordered the attachment.241  Faced with an inability to pay 
interest on its restructured debt and the prospect of being forced into another 
default, Peru settled, paying Elliott approximately $58 million.242 
Recent decisions reflect both the outcome and the policy considerations of 
the earlier precedents.  For example, in Turkmani v. Republic of Bolivia,243 the 
District Court for the District of Columbia relied on the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of the New York champerty statute in Elliott Associates.244  
Moreover, the court acknowledged the importance of the policy considerations 
reflected in the New York courts’ acceptance of litigation to enforce sovereign 
debt.  Quoting the Elliott Associates decision, the Turkmani court explained 
that enforcement would serve the long-term interests of both sovereign debtors 
and the debt markets by reducing the nonpayment risk associated with an 
investment in sovereign debt.245 After also rejecting the defendant’s sovereign 
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immunity defense, the court awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff.246 
The restructuring of Argentina’s sovereign debt has already created new 
tests for the scope of creditor litigation.  A number of bondholders have filed 
breach of contract suits, both individual and class actions, against Argentina.247  
These lawsuits have been fueled, in part, by Argentina’s proposed seventy-five 
percent haircut for existing debt.  Although several of the class actions were 
dismissed by the court on the grounds that they were unmanageable or that the 
plaintiff class was poorly defined, the court has granted summary judgment to 
various individual bondholders.248  The court’s analysis is straightforward: 
“The obligations of [Argentina] on the bonds involved in these lawsuits is 
unconditional.  Sovereign immunity has been waived.  [Argentina] defaulted 
on the bonds when it ceased to pay the interest.  This would seem to mean that 
[Argentina] now owes the three plaintiffs principal and accrued interest.”249 
In particular, the court explicitly rejected Argentina’s defenses, including 
those based on the act of state doctrine, considerations of comity, and section 
489 of the New York Judiciary Law.250  In granting summary judgment in 
favor of various individual plaintiffs, the court temporarily stayed its judgment 
to permit Argentina to propose a restructuring plan.251  In one of the most 
recent decisions, H.W. Urban GmbH v. Argentina,252 the court granted a 
motion for certification of a class of holders of two series of Argentine bonds.  
The court’s decision was the first to certify a class action in connection with a 
major sovereign debt restructuring.253 
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III.  THE ROLE OF HOLDOUT LITIGATION 
A. Responses to Holdout Litigation 
These recent cases of holdout litigation have heightened the urgency of the 
ongoing debate regarding the best means of limiting the power of holdout 
creditors.  Efforts by individual creditors, particularly vulture funds, to enforce 
their claims against sovereign debtors in court have been characterized as 
disruptive to the restructuring process and unfair to the creditors that 
participate in the restructurings.254  Vulture funds, in particular, have been 
criticized for purchasing sovereign debt at distressed prices and then holding 
out of restructuring plans, including plans that are acceptable to the vast 
majority of the other creditors, in an effort to secure for themselves higher 
payments from sovereign debtors.255  Holdout creditors may seek to be paid the 
total amounts owed on the debts.256  Alternatively, they may seek a relatively 
small premium over the proposed restructuring terms in an effort to coerce the 
debtors to avoid the nuisance costs associated with holdout litigation.257 
The resulting disruption in the restructuring process, critics argue, 
lengthens the time needed to complete restructurings and thereby increases the 
associated costs, burdening the citizens of the debtors and reducing the funds 
available to be paid to creditors.258  Preferential payments to vulture funds 
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further reduce the size of the payments that can be made to creditors under 
restructuring plans, augmenting the sense of unfairness among the creditors 
that accept the terms of the restructurings.259  Finally, critics argue that the 
potential for vulture funds to disrupt restructurings and to receive special 
payments not only discourages sovereign debtors from entering into the 
restructuring process but it also creates a collective action problem that 
dissuades other creditors from participating in the process.260 
Participants in the restructuring process have long sought ways to constrain 
the ability of dissenting creditors to thwart efforts to restructure sovereign debt 
and to secure favorable outcomes for themselves.  During the restructurings of 
the 1980s, bank advisory committees and sovereign debtors supported 
restructuring plans that treated all commercial banks equally as a means of 
minimizing both the costs of the restructuring process and the risks of 
individual banks dissenting from the plans and seeking higher payments on 
their loans.  By credibly committing to supporting only these plans, and by 
exploiting the business relationships among banks, the bank advisory 
committees, working with governmental regulators and the IMF, were able to 
pressure dissenting banks into supporting the proposed restructuring plans. 
Bondholders, particularly vulture funds, are not susceptible to these types 
of pressure.261  They act independently, seeking the highest immediate return 
on their investments, including their purchases of sovereign bonds, without 
concern for developing relationships with sovereign debtors or with other 
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investors.  They are not swayed by the urgings of regulators or directors of 
multilateral institutions.  As a result, they are often able to secure substantial 
payments―special treatment―for themselves, while disadvantaging other 
creditors and harming sovereign debtors. 
The imperviousness of vulture funds to existing sources of pressure, 
coupled with the perceived success of vulture funds in suing sovereign debtors, 
largely based on Elliott’s suit against Peru, have increased concerns that 
holdout creditors may disrupt restructurings.  The Argentine restructuring is 
viewed as particularly vulnerable.262  These concerns have led to widespread 
reform efforts to eliminate, or at least limit, the ability of recalcitrant 
bondholders to dissent from restructurings and pursue their claims against 
sovereign debtors in courts. 263 
There are three main approaches to addressing the holdout problem.  The 
first is a market-based approach in which the sovereign restructures the debt 
through an exchange offer coupled with amendments to the terms of the 
original debt effected through exit consents.  The second is a contractual 
mechanism, the use of CACs to facilitate the negotiation of a restructuring 
between the sovereign debtor and its creditors by enabling a majority of 
creditors to amend the terms of the debt over the objections of the holdouts.  
The third is an international bankruptcy procedure, the SDRM. 
1. Exchange Offers and Exit Consents 
Exchange offers permit debt to be restructured through a market process 
without the involvement of any legal tribunal and without any modifications to 
existing law.264  Essentially, an exchange offer is an offer by the sovereign to 
exchange new debt for old.  Because a bondholder’s decision to accept an 
exchange offer is voluntary, debtors that conduct exchange offers face a 
potential holdout problem.  Bondholders may refuse the offer in hopes of 
obtaining better terms as a holdout, either by forcing the debtor to buy them 
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out at a higher price in order to proceed with the restructuring or by continuing 
to receive payments in accordance with the terms of the original debt. 
Exit consents are designed to mitigate the holdout problem.  As a condition 
of the exchange offer, creditors accepting the offer are required to consent to 
various modifications to the terms of the original debt that reduce its value.  
Although amendments to the payment terms―principal and interest―by fewer 
than all of the holders are not permissible if the bonds have a uniform action 
clause (UAC), other terms can typically be modified by a majority or 
supermajority.  Waivers of sovereign immunity, submission to jurisdiction, 
financial covenants, and listing obligations are examples of such terms.265  The 
amendments are designed to make the original bonds less valuable, thereby 
making their retention less attractive to investors.266  Holders are thus 
pressured to accept the exchange offer rather than to hold out. 
The use of exit consents was pioneered in the 1980s in connection with 
corporate recapitalizations that typically involved restructurings of high-yield 
bonds.267  Courts generally accepted the approach.  In the leading case, Katz v. 
Oak Industries Inc.,268 the debtor offered to exchange its bonds for certificates 
guaranteeing (almost immediately) payment of cash sums that were greater 
than the market values of the bonds (but less than the face amounts of the 
bonds).269  As a condition to accepting the offer, bondholders were required to 
vote in favor of amendments to the terms of the bonds that eliminated all the 
financial covenants protecting the value of the bonds.270  Although the offer 
was challenged as violating the contractual obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing, the Delaware Chancery court upheld it.271 
More recently, Pakistan, Ecuador, and Uruguay have used exchange offers 
coupled with exit consents to restructure their bonds.  In the case of Ecuador, 
the approach resulted in approximately ninety-seven percent of the 
bondholders participating in the restructuring, which involved a substantial 
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reduction in the total stock of debt.272  In accepting the offer to exchange Brady 
Bonds and Eurobonds, 
tendering bondholders automatically agreed to amend the old bonds 
to remove the cross-default and negative pledge clauses, to allow 
Ecuador to reacquire and to hold certain of its Brady Bonds (thereby 
making it impossible for remaining bondholders to accelerate those 
instruments after the exchange), and to delist the old bonds.273 
Commentators report that the presence of the exit amendments played a 
“significant” role in “persuading” some bondholders to accept the exchange 
offer.274 
Despite the successful use of exchange offers and exit consents, it is 
unlikely that this approach will be viable in all circumstances.  The magnitude 
of the changes to the payment terms of the original bonds, particularly the 
reduction in the total principal amount of the bonds, necessary to relieve the 
sovereign debtor’s financial crisis may be so great as to prohibit an exchange 
from being economically feasible.  Alternatively, a court may find the exit 
amendments to be too substantial and refuse to enforce them against 
holdouts.275 Finally, in some cases, the buoying-up effect of the restructuring 
may be sufficiently great to overcome the negative effects of the exit consents.  
By holding out, a bondholder retains the original bonds, with the original 
payment terms but without the protective covenants, so that the value of the 
bonds is reduced.  Upon completion of the restructuring, however, the 
sovereign debtor’s total debt burden is reduced, thereby increasing the value of 
the bonds.  This increase in value caused by the restructuring, often called the 
“buoying-up” effect, may be greater than the decrease in value caused by the 
exit consents.276   
2. Collective Action Clauses 
CACs permit a majority or supermajority of bondholders to change the 
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payment terms of an issue of bonds.  CACs have long been a standard 
contractual term for sovereign bonds issued under U.K. law.  Sovereign bonds 
governed by U.S. law have, however, traditionally contained UACs, which 
require all creditors to consent to amendments of the payment terms.  Because 
under a UAC a majority of the holders cannot force minority holders to accept 
the terms of a proposed restructuring, the minority creditors may hold out from 
the restructuring, even if it is in the best interests of the bondholders.  CACs 
constrain this “tyranny of the minority”277 by enabling the holdouts to be 
overridden by a majority or supermajority vote.  In addition to addressing the 
collective action problem, CACs address the coordination problem caused by 
the fact that an increasing percentage of sovereign debt is held by dispersed 
public investors. 
A variety of participants in the sovereign debt market have endorsed 
encouraging or requiring the universal substitution of CACs for UACs in new 
bond issues.278  The advantages of CACs are straightforward.  Once a 
sovereign debtor reaches agreement with a majority or supermajority of the 
holders of an issue of its bonds, the bonds can be restructured despite the 
objections, or refusal to participate, of minority holders.  The negotiated terms 
bind all the holders.  Thus, CACs lessen the problem of creditor coordination 
by allowing the debtor to negotiate with representatives of a majority or 
supermajority of the bondholders.  In addition, CACs reduce the holdout 
problem by enabling a majority of the holders to force a restructuring upon a 
recalcitrant minority. 
Commentators first defend CACs as a contractual approach that avoids the 
shortcomings of a more intrusive regulatory solution.279  Indeed, supporters 
argue that, by solving the collective action problem and reducing the risk of 
holdouts, CACs should raise the value of debt.280  Although some have argued 
that CACs may create a moral hazard problem for sovereign debtors by 
reducing the difficulty of restructurings, recent empirical evidence indicates 
that the market does not view CACs as less attractive than UACs.281  This 
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suggests that creditors do not anticipate that the use of CACs will increase the 
likelihood of opportunistic defaults.  
Attempting to reform the restructuring process through the universal use of 
CACs, however, has several disadvantages.  CACs only enable the majority of 
creditors of a given issue to restructure that particular issue of bonds. They do 
not permit holders of one issue of bonds to force holders of another to accept 
the terms of a restructuring.  They neither require that all issues be restructured 
nor deal with potential problems of unfairness among holders of different 
issues.  Thus, while CACs may work effectively to change the terms of a 
single issue of bonds, or perhaps a limited number of issues,282 they offer little 
help in dealing with coordination and collective action problems in a country 
like Argentina, which is attempting to restructure 152 different bond issues 
involving seven different currencies and the governing laws of eight different 
countries.283  Moreover, the insertion of CACs into new issues of bonds does 
not address concerns regarding existing bonds, including the Argentine bonds, 
that contain UACs.  Due to the long-term nature of sovereign bonds, the full 
utility of CACs would not be realized until a considerable point in the future. 
Moreover, CACs may replace the tyranny of the minority with a tyranny of 
the majority.  In particular, CACs create the risk that majority bondholders will 
deal unfairly with the minority.  Although some commentators have argued 
that the majority’s decision to restructure is constrained by the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,284 it is not clear what content this 
doctrine has in limiting the right of any particular bondholder to base its voting 
decision exclusively on its own financial interests.  Notably, in a recent 
decision evaluating the duties of majority creditors in negotiating in 
accordance with a CAC, a British court specifically found that majority 
creditors had no obligation to negotiate on behalf of all creditors rather than in 
their own self interest.285  The court explained: “By signing up at the outset, 
each lender submits to the decision of the majority lenders at important forks in 
 
Collective Action Clauses, FIN. STABILITY REV., June 2000, at 142; Anthony Richards & Mark Gugiatti, Do 
Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging Markets, 6 INT’L FIN. 415 
(2003); Kostas Tsatsaronis, The Effect of Collective Action Clauses on Sovereign Bond Yields, BIS Q. REV., 
Nov. 1999, at 22. 
 282 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All?, 52 EMORY L.J. 417, 422-23 (2003) 
(observing that the value of CACs is limited to their ability to change the terms of a single class of debt). 
 283 Guillermo Nielsen, Secretary of Finance of Argentina, Remarks in Dubai 14 (Sept. 22, 2003), at 
http://www.argentinedebtinfo.gov.ar/documentos/discurso_gn_dubai_con_diap_english.pdf. 
 284 Bratton & Gulati, supra note 14. 
 285 Redwood Master Fund, Ltd. v. TD Bank Eur. Ltd., [2002] All E.R. (D) 41 (Dec) (Ch. 2002). 
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the road.”286  The problem of heterogeneous bondholder interest exacerbates 
the risk of unfairness to some bondholders. 
CACs are a contractual term, and so their inclusion must be acceptable to 
bondholders and sovereign debtors.  The Treasury Department, the IMF, and 
other participants have argued for the use of CACs in all new issues of bonds, 
reasoning that CACs have not impaired the marketability of bonds that contain 
them.  Yet, bondholders and sovereign debtors have not demanded this 
solution to the holdout problem on their own.  Despite the official 
encouragement, only a small percentage of sovereign bonds, particularly 
emerging market bonds, contains CACs.287 
Finally, CACs do not eliminate the strategic use of litigation, the stated 
goal of their inclusion in debt instruments.  Unless and until courts develop a 
jurisprudence clarifying the rights and responsibilities of creditor groups in 
restructurings, holdout creditors will continue to enforce their claims against 
sovereign debtors in courts.  In addition to holdout litigation, CACs may 
spawn a new class of intercreditor suits as dissenting bondholders challenge 
the restructuring terms imposed by the majority or supermajority of 
bondholders.  Indeed, the uncertainty associated with judicial review of all 
these claims may offer a partial explanation for the failure of the market to 
attribute greater value to bonds subject to CACs. 
3. The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
Of the various proposals for some form of sovereign bankruptcy procedure, 
the one that has attracted the most attention is the proposal by Dr. Krueger.288  
In its most recent form, the SDRM would create a process by which a majority 
of creditors could negotiate a restructuring that would then be binding upon all 
creditors.289  The advantages of the SDRM over the universal use of CACs 
include the SDRM’s ability to deal with multiple issues of bonds and its 
 
 286 Id. at 27. 
 287 Yan Liu, Int’l Monetary Fund, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds 23 (Aug. 
30, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/liu.pdf. For recent 
examinations of this phenomenon, see Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition 
in the Shadow of the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691 (2004); Stephen Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929 
(2004); and Int’l Monetary Fund, Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts―Encouraging 
Greater Use (June 2002), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2002/eng/060602a.pdf. 
 288 See Int’l Monetary Fund, Proposals for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM): A Fact 
Sheet, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdrm.htm (Jan. 2003). 
 289 Id. 
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applicability to existing debt, including bonds issued with UACs. 
While Dr. Krueger and the IMF continue to develop the SDRM, the basic 
procedure would place primary responsibility for negotiating restructurings in 
the hands of creditors.290  Practically speaking, the SDRM is more of a 
workout mechanism than an international bankruptcy court.  The SDRM would 
group creditors into a single class that would have the power to restructure all 
debt subject to the SDRM (domestic debt would not be included) by vote of a 
qualified majority of the class.291  A judge or some type of official would 
resolve disputes among creditors but, unlike the bankruptcy process, the judge 
would not evaluate the substantive terms of the restructuring for fairness.292  A 
restructuring negotiated by the supermajority of creditors would be binding on 
all creditors subject to the restructuring. 
Importantly, the proposal does not include a standstill or a stay on creditor 
enforcement of claims through litigation.293  This reflects a change from earlier 
IMF proposals.  Instead, the proposal provides that disruptive litigation will be 
discouraged through the application of the so-called “Hotchpot rule,” whereby 
any amounts received by a creditor through litigation will be deducted from 
that creditor’s approved claim under the restructuring agreement.294  Although 
application of this rule would reduce the incentive for some litigation, it would 
not affect litigation by creditors who are able to obtain a greater recovery 
through litigation than through the restructuring.295 
A substantial limitation of the SDRM is its failure to address intercreditor 
fairness in the restructuring process.  The majority creditors are the ones who 
have a seat at the negotiating table.  The SDRM offers no formal procedure to 
involve small or retail investors in the negotiations and, instead, offers a legal 
mechanism designed to reduce their power vis-à-vis the majority.  To the 
extent that banks are the majority creditors, there are reasons to question their 
ability to act as effective agents for the minority.  Indeed, there are substantial 
differences in creditor interests.  Moreover, adoption of the SDRM would 
 
 290 Id. 
 291 Anne Krueger, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Messy or Messier?, AM. ECON. REV., May 2003, at 70, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/010403.htm. 
 292 Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 287. 
 293 Krueger, supra note 291, at 72. 
 294 Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 287. 
 295 See Kunibert Raffer, To Stay or Not to Stay―A Short Note on Differing Versions of the SDRM (Jan. 
31, 2003) (demonstrating the effect of the Hotchpot rule through numerical examples), available at http:// 
www.jubileeplus.org/latest/raffer310103.htm. 
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affect the price of outstanding sovereign debt.  In particular, uncertainties 
about the implementation and operation of the SDRM are likely to reduce the 
price of debt, adversely affecting existing creditors. 
B. Benefits of Holdout Litigation 
Each of the three proposals to reform the restructuring process ignores the 
developments in the international capital markets and in legal doctrines that 
have engendered litigation by holdout creditors.  More importantly, the 
proposals give short shrift to the positive effects of an enforcement remedy on 
the restructuring process and the sovereign debt market. 
Holdout litigation appears to be the product of developments in two 
distinct, but related, spheres―the markets and the courts.  As the sovereign 
debt market has developed to include diverse creditors with differing 
interests,296 the judiciary has developed an approach that narrowly interprets 
the defenses asserted by sovereign debtors in suits brought by creditors.297  
Thus, as the likelihood of recalcitrant creditors has increased, the ability of 
these creditors to pursue their claims through litigation has also increased.  The 
restructuring process, however, has not advanced to reflect these 
developments. 
In the restructurings of the 1930s,298 the bondholder committees, including 
the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, lacked both the authority to bind 
bondholders to agreements with sovereign debtors and an effective means of 
pressuring recalcitrant bondholders to accept restructuring plans that had been 
negotiated with debtors.  In addition, holdout creditors were unable to pursue 
their claims against sovereign debtors in court.  As a result, restructurings were 
completed only over the course of long periods of time, causing additional 
distress for sovereign debtors as well as losses for bondholders.  Ultimately, 
these difficulties led to the collapse of the market for sovereign bonds. 
In the restructurings of the 1980s,299 the bank advisory committees were 
able to pressure recalcitrant banks, generally smaller commercial banks, to 
assent to proposed restructuring plans and to refrain from litigating their 
claims.  The terms of these plans, however, tended to favor the interests of the 
 
 296 These developments are discussed supra in Part I.B. and Part I.C. 
 297 The development of this approach is discussed supra in Part II. 
 298 These restructurings are discussed supra in Part I.B.1. 
 299 These restructurings are discussed supra in Part I.B.2. 
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large commercial banks over the interests of the smaller commercial banks, 
creating a tyranny of the majority.  Moreover, the perception among the 
smaller banks that their interests were subsumed to the interests of the large 
banks created strains among the banks participating in the restructurings.  The 
tensions led to the development of a secondary market for sovereign debt, and 
they may have also contributed to the reduction in the availability of loans to 
sovereign debtors. 
For current and future restructurings, holdout litigation may provide a 
means of avoiding the failures evident in the restructurings of 1930s and the 
1980s by allowing creditors to enforce their claims against sovereign debtors.  
If creditors can use lawsuits to challenge the terms of proposed restructuring 
plans, sovereign debtors may be limited in their ability to delay the completion 
of the restructuring process.  Similarly, holdout litigation offers a mechanism 
by which minority creditors can challenge restructurings designed principally 
for the benefit of the majority of the creditors. 
Holdout litigation may also indirectly introduce efficiencies into the 
restructuring process.  By permitting recalcitrant creditors to reject the terms of 
a proposed restructuring plan, including a plan supported by a majority of the 
other creditors, and to pursue successfully their claims against the sovereign 
debtor in court, holdout litigation may entice vulture funds to enter the 
sovereign debt market.300  To the extent vulture funds purchase significant 
blocks of claims, they may reduce the administrative burden associated with 
restructuring sovereign debt.  By aggregating claims, vulture funds may serve 
as a forum for coordinating the actions of creditors, especially among the 
creditors who sell their claims to the funds.301  At the same time, vulture funds 
may also provide a mechanism through which communications and  
 
 300 For example, in describing Elliott’s decision to purchase a portion of Peru’s distressed debt, one 
commentator noted that “[t]he team at Elliott examined the situation, determined that Peru was getting away 
with paying banks rather less than it ought, and held out for a better deal.  They also, of course, judged their 
chances of being able to win a court case against a sovereign.”  Felix Salmon, Elliott Associates’ Aggression 
Captures Low-Risk Returns, EUROMONEY, Feb. 2004, at 36. 
 301 See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1253-54 (noting the coordinating role of vulture funds in the 
context of exchange offers for corporate bonds that are coupled with exit consents); see also ROSENBERG, 
supra note 130, at 25-36 (describing the role of vulture funds in reducing the administrative burden associated 
with corporate reorganizations); Yap, supra note 255, at 219 (same).  This aggregation function may, in many 
ways, be similar to the role of select investors in aggregating claims in class action lawsuits, particularly those 
involving securities fraud.  See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: 
Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239, 1250-52 (discussing the role of class 
action lawsuits in general, and lead plaintiffs in particular, in aggregating claims in cases involving securities 
fraud). 
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negotiating costs may be reduced.302 
In addition to improving the restructuring process, holdout litigation may 
enhance the operation of the sovereign debt market.  Specifically, holdout 
litigation may serve as a potential check on opportunistic defaults by sovereign 
debtors.  If sovereign debtors expect that creditors, especially recalcitrant 
creditors, will enforce their claims through litigation, then they may be less 
likely to default when they are able to make the payments required on their 
debts.  By reducing the probability of opportunistic defaults, holdout litigation 
may increase capital flows.  Indeed, participants in the sovereign debt market 
appear to value judicial enforcement of debt claims.  In Allied Bank, for 
example, the Clearing House supported the efforts of a single commercial bank 
to enforce its claims against Costa Rica, even though the litigation had the 
effect of disrupting the proposed restructuring plan.303  Recent developments in 
the interpretation of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments 
provide further evidence that creditors, and even sovereign debtors, value the 
curb that holdout litigation imposes on opportunistic defaults.304  Despite 
widespread expressions of concern regarding the court’s interpretation of this 
clause in Elliott’s suit against Peru,305 the court’s decision did not result in 
changes to the language of pari passu clauses contained in new debt 
instruments to remove the power the interpretation gives to holdout creditors 
so as to render the decision ineffective.306  Instead, as Stephen Choi and Mitu 
Gulati show, “the change that came was . . . the elevation of the importance of 
the [clause] . . . [a]s . . . in all but three of the new [debt] contracts, the vote 
required to change the pari passu [clause] was elevated from a 50% or 66.67% 
 
 302 Any reduction in the administrative burden of the restructuring process resulting from the 
consolidation of claims of many creditors, however, may be overshadowed by the costs incurred as a result of 
any litigation that the vulture funds pursue in respect of the purchased claims.  See Vultures the Truly Evil 
Face of Capitalism, SUN. TRIB. (Ireland), May 12, 2002, at 9 (discussing the role of legal fees in sovereign debt 
restructurings). 
 303 This litigation is discussed supra Part II. 
 304 Recall that in connection with Elliott’s suit against Peru, a Brussels court interpreted the pari passu 
clause in the letter agreements Elliott purchased as precluding Peru from making a payment on its Brady 
Bonds without making a pro rata payment to Elliott.  The decision caused Peru to settle the case by making a 
substantial payment to Elliott.  
 305 See G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 638 (2000) (describing 
the interpretation as putting “a large hammer in the hands of holdout creditors, thereby enabling them to cause 
even more disruption in restructurings”).  In fact, holdout creditors relied on the interpretation of the clause in 
pursuing their claims against sovereign debtors in courts located not only in Brussels but also in California, 
New York, and London.  See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 240, at 877-79 (summarizing the status of the 
litigation). 
 306 Choi & Gulati, supra note 287, at 993. 
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vote threshold to the heightened 75% or 85% threshold.”307  The effort by 
creditors, and perhaps sovereign debtors, to preserve the availability of holdout 
litigation in the face of uncertainty may be particularly valuable in the context 
of the sovereign debt market in which other constraints on opportunistic 
defaults appear to operate poorly.  In particular, a sovereign debtor’s reputation 
may be of limited importance as, although the empirical evidence is mixed, 
studies indicate that a sovereign debtor’s reputation for repayment has little 
effect on its ability to borrow.308 
Holdout litigation may also increase the liquidity of the market for 
sovereign debt.  By serving as a catalyst for vulture funds to purchase 
distressed sovereign debt, holdout litigation draws active participants into the 
market.  These funds create liquidity for other investors by offering them a 
means of exiting the market for a fixed sum of money.309  Retail investors, 
notably those with fixed incomes, may benefit from the ability to monetize 
their claims.310  At the same time, these transactions provide information 
regarding prices that banks and other institutional investors require to mark 
their portfolios to market.311  Moreover, even if these creditors do not wish to 
 
 307 Id. at 994.  As Professor Choi and Professor Gulati explain, “the pari passu [clause] that no one seems 
to understand and that provided for a heightened risk of holdouts, instead of getting clarified or eliminated in 
the new [debt] contracts, got elevated, thereby further increasing the risk of holdouts!”  Id. 
 308 Upon completing their study of the experiences with sovereign debt for a period over one hundred 
years, Peter Lindert and Peter Morton conclude that “investors seem to pay little attention to the past 
repayment record of [sovereign debtors]. . . .  [T]hey do not punish governments with a prior default history, 
undercutting the belief in a penalty that compels faithful repayment.”  Peter H. Lindert & Peter J. Morton, How 
Sovereign Debt Has Worked, in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 102, 
at 39, 40; see also Eliana A. Cardoso & Rudiger Dornbusch, Brazilian Debt Crisis: Past and Present, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 19, at 106 (finding an absence of 
reputation effects in the sovereign debt market); Barry Eichengreen, Historical Research on International 
Lending and Debt, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 149, 160-62 (1991) (concluding that reputation effects have limited 
impact in the market for sovereign debt); Jorgensen & Sachs, supra note 19, at 106 (same).  But see Sule 
Ozler, Have Commercial Banks Ignored History?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 608 (finding evidence of reputation 
effects in the sovereign debt market); Michael Tomz, How Do Reputations Form?: New and Seasoned 
Borrowers in International Capital Markets (Aug. 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (same), available at  
http://www.stanford. edu/~tomz/working/apsa01.pdf. 
 309 Absent this option, the investors, like bondholders during the restructurings of the 1930s and the 
smaller commercial banks during the early years of the restructurings of the 1980s, must hold their claims 
through the completion of the restructuring.  See, e.g., Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading 
Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1990) (describing the role 
of vulture funds in providing liquidity in the market for distressed corporate debt); Vulture Hunt, FIN. TIMES, 
May 7, 2002, at 20 (arguing that vulture funds provide liquidity in the market for sovereign debt). 
 310 Although these investors may be loath to sell their sovereign bonds at a loss, their financial positions 
may require them to sell the bonds to generate cash for immediate expenses.  See Lapper, supra note 135 
(noting the difficult position of retail investors who purchased sovereign bonds issued by Argentina). 
 311 See S. Richard Orzy, Secondary Market Players: Vultures or Value Enhancers?, 20 NAT’L 
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litigate their claims against sovereign debtors, they may still obtain value from 
the litigation remedy by selling their holdings of sovereign debt to other 
investors that are more inclined toward litigation. 
C. Tools for Managing Holdout Litigation 
While protecting the ability of holdout creditors to enforce their claims 
against sovereign debtors through litigation enhances the restructuring process 
and the sovereign debt market, holdout litigation has the capacity to disrupt 
restructurings.  The extent of the disruption is unclear.312  Uncertainty 
regarding the relative benefits and cost of holdout litigation, and the role of the 
litigation option in future restructurings, calls for an incremental approach to 
reform.313  Rather than broad proposals designed to apply to all sovereign 
debtors and all restructuring plans, limited reform efforts specifically tailored 
to the scope of the litigation remedy and the potential for abuse of the remedy 
are likely to have the greatest success in resolving the tensions created by 
holdout litigation.  Instead of exchange offers coupled with exit consents, 
universal CACs, or the SDRM, we argue for relatively modest changes to the 
terms of sovereign debt instruments that would directly affect the ability of 
investors to pursue holdout litigation. 
Focusing on the terms contained in debt instruments that are governed by 
 
INSOLVENCY REV. 1, 9-10 (2003) (describing the importance of bid and ask prices in indicating the value of 
distressed corporate debt), available at 2003 C.N.I.R. LEXIS 1. 
 312 On the one hand, Dr. Krueger has argued that holdout litigation so adversely impacts the restructuring 
process as to require the implementation of the SDRM to limit, or perhaps eliminate, holdout litigation.  
Krueger, New Approach, supra note 3.  At the other end of the spectrum, Andrei Shleifer has argued that, by 
limiting the potential for holdout litigation and thereby weakening the rights of creditors, the SDRM will 
aggravate existing problems in the restructuring process.  ANDREI SHLEIFER, WILL THE SOVEREIGN DEBT 
MARKET SURVIVE? (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2000, 2003), available at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2003papers/2003list. html.  Between these two poles, commentators 
have argued that “nearly a decade after it first became the focus of policy and academic attention, the holdout 
problem has all but failed to materialize.”  Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign 
Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1119, 1143-44 (2004); see also Roubini, supra note 11, at 7 (identifying ten 
reasons “why the holdout problem is not a big problem in practice,” including the desire of creditors, even 
vulture funds, to avoid the costs of litigation and the availability of side payments, or bribes, to remove the 
incentive to hold out). 
 313 In addition, the balance between the benefits and the costs of holdout litigation is likely to vary from 
case to case, depending upon the characteristics of the sovereign debtor.  Sovereign debtors with relatively 
good prospects for stable growth may benefit from demonstrating a strong commitment to satisfy the 
obligations imposed by their debts.  By subjecting themselves to a substantial risk of holdout litigation, these 
debtors may signal to creditors that they will refrain from defaulting opportunistically.  Other sovereign 
debtors, those with poor outlooks for growth, may do better to direct their efforts to minimizing the likelihood 
of holdout litigation as a means of reducing the costs associated with restructurings of their debts. 
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New York law, we argue that sovereign debtors could readily offer bonds for 
which the threat of disruptive holdout litigation is constrained.  Modifying 
these debt instruments in accordance with our suggestions would limit the 
prospect of harmful litigation while retaining the availability of the litigation 
remedy in cases of overreaching by either the majority of the bondholders or 
the sovereign debtor.  Moreover, the extent to which investors demand higher 
interest rates to purchase these bonds would provide a means of measuring the 
extent to which investors value the litigation option.  The value of our 
suggestions, then, could be tested directly in the sovereign debt market. 
What type of modifications to fiscal agency agreements do we suggest?  
We first identify changes that are designed to reduce the power of bondholders 
to act individually.  We next consider the designation of a representative, 
perhaps in the form of a trustee, to assist the bondholders in acting as a group.  
We then discuss refinements to limit the diversity among bondholders.  
Finally, we consider explicit enforcement rights for minority bondholders in 
the event of discriminatory treatment in connection with a default or a  
restructuring of the bonds. 
Most sovereign bonds issued in the United States are issued pursuant to a 
fiscal agency agreement.314  The agreement governs the relationship between 
the sovereign debtor and the fiscal agent, which is typically the investment 
bank, perhaps in connection with one of its affiliates, serving as lead 
underwriter for the offering of the bonds.315  The fiscal agent is the agent of the 
sovereign debtor, as issuer of the bonds.316  The agreement also governs the 
terms of the bonds. 
The fiscal agent does not act for the bondholders.  As a result, the 
bondholders typically retain the power to act individually in the event of a 
default on the bonds.  The individual actions can include accelerating the 
principal amount of the bonds and suing to collect for breach of the 
agreement.317  Each bondholder has the right, upon the occurrence of an event 
of default, to demand payment of the full principal amount of its bonds and to 
file suit against the sovereign debtor to collect the payment. 
 
 314 Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 275, at 1332. 
 315 Macmillan, Debt Crisis, supra note 28, at 342. 
 316 Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 275, at 1332. 
 317 See id. at 1330-32 (describing acceleration clauses and enforcement restrictions in sovereign debt 
instruments).  Acceleration of the principal amount of all the bonds typically requires the vote of holders of at 
least twenty-five percent of the outstanding bonds, measured in terms of the principal amount of the bonds.  Id. 
at 1330. 
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This structure differs markedly from the rights provided to bondholders 
pursuant to a trust indenture.318  Specifically, under the terms of a trust 
indenture, individual bondholders do not have the right to accelerate the 
principal amounts of their bonds.  Instead, each bondholder has the right to file 
suit against the debtor only for payments of interest and principal that are not 
made on their respective due dates.319  The trustee, as agent for the 
bondholders, possesses the right to accelerate the principal amount of all the 
bonds and to sue the debtor for the total amount.320 
To limit the incentives of bondholders to commence disruptive litigation, 
sovereign debtors might modify the terms of the fiscal agency agreements 
pursuant to which they issue bonds to eliminate the right of individual 
bondholders to accelerate the principal amounts of their bonds in the event of a 
default.  Rather than retaining the right to demand payment for the entire 
principal amount of its bonds, each bondholder might be limited to the right to 
sue the sovereign debtor only for unpaid interest and principal.  This 
modification would reduce the attractiveness of holdout litigation by sharply 
limiting the size of the judgment potentially available to a bondholder while 
simultaneously increasing the expense of pursuing the claim.  In Elliott 
Associates,321 Elliott’s ability to accelerate the principal amount of its letter 
agreements allowed it to obtain a judgment against Peru for over $55 million, 
creating a strong incentive to pursue the claim it had purchased for 
approximately $11 million.  If, as we suggest, the claim were limited to unpaid 
interest (and, of course, principal at maturity), a bondholder would have 
relatively weak incentives to pursue holdout litigation.  Moreover, the 
necessity of bringing multiple suits for each missed interest payment over an 
extended period of years would increase the burden of the litigation relative to 
 
 318 As Mr. Buchheit and Professor Gulati note, this convention also differs from the rights provided to 
bondholders under trust deeds, which are commonly used in the United Kingdom.  Trust deeds provide that 
only the trustee has the power to enforce the instrument.  Individual bondholders do not have the right to file 
suit against the sovereign debtor unless the trustee, having been instructed by holders of a specified percentage 
of the outstanding bonds, fails to commence an enforcement action.  Moreover, any recoveries made by the 
trustee must be shared pro rata among the bondholders.  Id. at 1331. 
 319 Id. at 1331-32; see also Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between 
Individual and Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1049-50 (2002) (noting that “[t]his right is 
unqualified and may thus be exercised independently by any holder regardless of whether the trustee or the 
other bondholders approve of such suit”). 
 320 Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 275, at 1332.  Individual bondholders recover the right to sue for the 
total amount of the bonds in the event the trustee, having been instructed by the holders of at least twenty-five 
percent of the outstanding bonds and offered satisfactory indemnification, fails to commence an enforcement 
action within a specified period of time, typically sixty days.  Id. 
 321 This case is discussed supra Part II. 
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its expected benefits. 
In addition, the ability of bondholders to act on their own might be limited 
by modifying the terms of the agreements to require the affirmative vote of a 
designated percentage of the outstanding bonds to commence any litigation on 
behalf of any bondholder.322  For example, the approval of the holders of at 
least twenty-five percent of the outstanding bonds, measured in terms of 
principal amount, might be required before a bondholder would be permitted to 
file suit against the sovereign debtor.  The required threshold for commencing 
litigation need not, of course, be the same as the requirement for accelerating 
the principal amounts of all the bonds.  Thus, for instance, a vulture fund might 
acquire twenty-five percent of the outstanding bonds by purchasing them at 
deep discounts from their face values in the secondary market and thereby 
satisfy the requirement for acceleration.  Yet, if the required threshold for 
commencing litigation were thirty-five percent, the fund would not be able to 
pursue the claim by filing suit against the sovereign debtor in court.323   
Regardless of the nature of the claim, and regardless of the particular 
proportion of the outstanding bonds designated as necessary to commence 
litigation, the requirement of securing the affirmative vote of the holders of a 
specified percentage of the outstanding bonds will impose delays on, and 
increase the expense of, suits against the sovereign debtor.  These obstacles 
reduce the attractiveness of the litigation remedy as well as the likelihood that 
bondholders will undertake litigation that is disruptive to the restructuring 
process and harmful to other creditors.  In particular, they lower the chance 
that nuisance litigation will be a profitable undertaking.  Significantly, in 
addition to reducing the attractiveness of litigation, this modification may also 
assist the bondholders in acting as a group as collective action among the 
bondholders would, in almost all circumstances, be necessary to accelerate the 
principal amounts of the bonds and to commence litigation against the 
sovereign debtor.  Actions taken as a group may reduce concerns regarding 
differential treatment of bondholders and disruption of the restructuring 
process. In particular, the requirement of group action would alleviate the 
concern that, by initiating litigation, holdout creditors were seeking to “jump 
the line.” 
 
 322 For a discussion of a similar proposal, see Macmillan, Debt Work-Out System, supra note 28, at 103-
04. 
 323 Alternatively, the agreement might provide a higher threshold for acceleration—preserving an 
individual bondholder’s access to the courts but limiting the power of the litigation remedy. 
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A similar coordination of bondholder interests could be achieved by issuing 
sovereign bonds pursuant to trust indentures, rather than fiscal agency 
agreements.  A trust indenture provides for a trustee to serve as the agent for 
the bondholders, rather than for a fiscal agent to serve as the agent of the 
sovereign debtor.  Although the duties of a trustee are limited, they are not 
inconsequential,324 and they are enhanced upon the occurrence of default on 
the bonds.325  Typically, only the trustee is entitled to accelerate the principal 
amounts of the bonds and to file suit against the debtor.  Absent a failure on the 
part of the trustee, the bondholders are limited in the claims they may bring 
against the debtor.  In this way, the use of a trust indenture, and a trustee, limits 
the scope of the litigation option for individual bondholders while preserving 
the viability of litigation to enforce the obligations of the debtor.326 
In addition, by providing for a trustee to serve as the agent for the 
bondholders, a trust indenture may reduce incentives to pursue holdout 
litigation by limiting the funds available to satisfy judgments against the 
debtor.  Because the trustee serves the interests of the bondholders, and not the 
debtor, the transfer to the trustee by the debtor of funds for payment on the 
bonds may remove the funds from the scope of a judgment against the debtor.  
This result differs from the consequences of transferring funds to a fiscal agent, 
which may not be sufficient to avoid the reach of attachment orders.  In Elliott 
Associates,327 for example, Elliott sought to enforce its judgment against Peru 
in respect of its letter agreements by seeking to attach funds for the payment of 
interest on the Brady Bonds that Peru was to transfer to the fiscal agent for the 
Brady Bonds.328  In pursuing this strategy, Elliott argued that the funds would 
 
 324 As long as no default on the bonds has occurred, the trustee’s duties are limited to the duties that are 
explicitly set forth in the trust indenture.  As a general matter, these duties relate to the administration of the 
trust indenture and the bonds: maintaining a register of the bondholders and authenticating the bonds.  See AM. 
BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 165-68, 181, 247-50 (1971) (discussing the duties of the 
trustee). 
 325 Upon the occurrence of an event of default, the trustee’s duties expand, requiring it to exercise the 
rights and powers granted to it under the trust indenture and to use the same degree of care and skill in their 
exercise as a prudent person would under the same circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs.  Id. at 249-
50 (discussing the duties of the trustee upon the occurrence of an event of default). 
 326 Note that the fees paid to the trustee for its services, which are the responsibility of the debtor, are 
likely to be significantly less than the costs incurred as a consequence of any holdout litigation.  The annual 
fee for a trustee is typically quite modest, while the cost of defending a suit (even a nuisance suit) brought by a 
recalcitrant bondholder can be substantial.  See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATE 
FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 456 (3d ed. 2001) (describing the selection criteria for trustees as including 
competence in ministerial tasks and low fees); Vultures the Truly Evil Face of Capitalism, supra note 302. 
 327 This case is discussed supra Part II. 
 328 See Eric Lindenbaum & Alicia Duran, Debt Restructuring: Legal Considerations, MERRILL LYNCH 
EMERGING MARKETS RES., Oct. 2000, at 3 (describing Elliott’s efforts to enforce its judgment against Peru), 
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remain the property of Peru even after transfer to the fiscal agent, as the fiscal 
agent was Peru’s agent.329  If the Brady Bonds had been issued under a trust 
indenture, then the funds would have been transferred to a trustee, an agent of 
the bondholders, and Elliott’s enforcement strategy may not have been 
successful.330 
Rather than simply adopting the standard terms of trust indentures, which 
impose limited duties on, and grant few rights to, trustees, trust indentures for 
sovereign bonds might be structured to impose significant responsibilities on 
trustees and to grant them corresponding powers.331  The trustee, for instance, 
could be charged with pursuing all claims of the bondholders against the 
sovereign debtor.  The trustee would thus have the obligation and the authority 
to commence all litigation on behalf of the bondholders, including suits for 
unpaid interest and principal on the bonds and suits for the total principal 
amount of all the bonds upon acceleration.  In this way, the trustee would hold 
the power of the litigation remedy for the benefit of all the bondholders.  At the 
same time, the bondholders would lack the ability to engage in litigation that is 
disruptive to the restructuring process and harmful to other creditors. 
The trustee could also be empowered to represent the bondholders in any 
restructuring of the bonds.  One possibility would limit the trustee’s authority 
to participating in negotiations with the sovereign debtor regarding the terms of 
the restructuring and then recommending proposed restructuring terms to the 
bondholders for their ratification.  Alternatively, the trustee’s authority might 
extend to modifying the terms of the bonds without the consent of the 
bondholders; that is, the trustee might be authorized to negotiate the terms of a 
restructuring of the bonds with the sovereign debtor and to accept those terms 
on behalf of the bondholders, without involving the bondholders in the 
restructuring process.332  The trustee might also be designated as the 
 
available at http://www.emta.org/keyper/linden1.pdf. 
 329 Id.  Elliott served a restraining order on the fiscal agent, with the intent of attaching the funds upon 
transfer to the agent.  To avoid the attachment, and a default on the Brady Bonds, Peru settled the case by 
making a substantial payment to Elliott and then paid the interest on the Brady Bonds.  Id. 
 330 The use of a trustee, rather than a fiscal agent, does not, however, guarantee that funds transferred in 
respect to the bonds will be protected from attachment.  Id. 
 331 In the context of corporate bonds, Yakov Amihud and others have proposed the creation of a 
“supertrustee” with substantial duties and powers, including those related to the enforcement and the 
renegotiation of the terms of the indenture.  Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure for Corporate 
Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447 (1999). 
 332 The trust indenture could, however, reserve to the bondholders the right to reject the restructuring 
terms implemented through the actions of the trustee.  Any terms negotiated and accepted by the trustee might 
be overturned within a specified period of time, for example forty-five days, upon the vote of a supermajority 
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representative of the bondholders on any committee of bondholders that is 
formed in connection with a restructuring of the bonds.333 
In representing the bondholders, either in court or in the restructuring 
process, the trustee would serve the interests of all bondholders, as the trustee 
would be the agent of all the bondholders, appointed through the trust 
indenture.334  Thus, the trustee would not be permitted to favor the interests of 
one class of investors―banks and other institutional investors―over the 
interests of another―retail investors. 
Refinements to sovereign debt instruments could also limit heterogeneity 
among the bondholders by limiting the class of potential holders.  Prior to the 
implementation of the Brady Plan, debt instruments often contained provisions 
that were designed to limit the diversity among the class of debtholders by 
precluding assignment of the debt to nonfinancial institutions.  Although in 
Pravin335 the court found that the relevant provision was not sufficiently 
explicit to prohibit assignment to nonfinancial institutions, careful drafting 
could easily create an enforceable restriction on assignability.  Sovereign 
debtors could thus sell their bonds to selected types of investors in the initial 
offering, and then, through restrictive assignment provisions in the agreement 
 
of the bondholders. 
 333 These committees may be appointed through the actions of the sovereign debtors, as was the case of 
the bank advisory committees during the 1980s, or they may be formed by the bondholders themselves, as was 
more typically the case during the restructurings of the 1930s.  Regardless of the manner in which any 
particular committee is organized, the trustee could be designated, under the terms of the trust indenture, as the 
representative of the bondholders on all committees.  This approach would minimize the costs of selecting a 
representative of the bondholders, as no formal action of the bondholders would be necessary.  In the current 
crisis involving the restructuring of Argentina’s debt, for example, bondholders have organized a number of 
committees, and they have also organized the committees into a “supercommittee,” the Global Committee of 
Argentine Bondholders, which was formed in January of 2004 and represents over 500 institutional investors 
and retail investor groups.  See Argentina Creditors Unite to Speed Up Bond Talks, ANSA ENG. MEDIA 
SERVICE, Jan. 12, 2004 (describing the creation of the Global Committee of Argentine Bondholders); Don’t 
Lie to Me, Argentina, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 15, 2004, at 7 (same). 
 334 Absent the imposition of fiduciary duties to serve the interests of bondholders, the trustee may not 
provide an entirely robust check on low restructuring terms, because the trustee, while the agent of the 
bondholders, is chosen by the debtor.  Like the banks that sold sovereign bonds to investors in the 1920s, the 
trustee may have incentives to serve the interests of the debtor over the interests of the bondholders.  Similarly, 
the trustee may not completely eliminate discriminatory restructuring terms.  Trustees are typically banks, and 
so they may, for the sake of business relationships, be inclined to favor the interests of banks over the interests 
of other investors.  As a result, the terms of the restructurings, like the terms of the restructurings in the 1980s, 
may favor the interests of banks and other institutional investors.  Nonetheless, trustees may seek to develop 
reputations for acting in the interests of all the bondholders, and investors may be able to use the market to 
pressure sovereign debtors to select these trustees.  See Amihud et al., supra note 331, at 471-72, 484-85 
(discussing similar issues in the context of supertrustees for corporate bonds). 
 335 This case is discussed supra in Part II. 
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governing the bonds, limit the types of investors to whom the bonds could be 
resold in the secondary market.  In addition to the general category of 
nonfinancial institutions, vulture funds or retail investors336 could be 
specifically precluded from holding the bonds.  Although limitations on 
assignability would reduce the liquidity of the bonds, the limitations would 
also reduce the range of interests that would be implicated in a restructuring, 
facilitating creditor coordination and limiting the likelihood of disruptive and 
harmful litigation. 
Finally, the terms of fiscal agency agreements might be modified to provide 
specific enforcement rights for bondholders that have been discriminated 
against in the context of a default or restructuring.337  For example, in the case 
in which a sovereign debtor fails to make a required payment to a portion of 
the bondholders, the agreement might provide that the vote of holders of 
twenty-five percent of only those bonds experiencing the default is necessary 
to accelerate the principal of those bonds, rather than requiring the vote of 
holders of twenty-five percent of the outstanding bonds to accelerate the 
principal on all the bonds.338  By adjusting the threshold required for 
accelerating the unmatured principal on bonds in this way, this proposed 
change would provide a means for aggrieved bondholders to enforce their 
rights when the rights of other bondholders have not been infringed.  At the 
same time, the modification would also provide incentives for these 
 
 336 Some commentators have expressed particular concern regarding the use of class action lawsuits in the 
restructuring process.  The class action mechanism is a procedural tool to facilitate the litigation of claims in 
which the interests of individual class members are small.  See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and 
Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring/Summer 2001, at 53, 55-56 (describing the role of class actions in facilitating the litigation of small 
claims).  Limiting the participation of small investors, particularly retail investors, in the sovereign debt market 
is virtually guaranteed to eliminate the potential for class action litigation. 
 337 Marcel Kahan has proposed a similar modification to the trust indentures governing corporate bonds.  
See Kahan, supra note 319, at 1074.  These rights may provide a means for minority bondholders to protect 
themselves from a tyranny of the majority, and this protection may be particularly important in the absence of 
judicial enforcement of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing among bondholders in sovereign 
debt restructurings.  Specifically, these rights may provide some explicit protections for minority creditors, 
obviating the need to rely on the courts to recognize and enforce intercreditor duties.  For a discussion of the 
problems associated with the reliance on contract terms, as well as the significance of duties among holders of 
sovereign debt, see Bratton & Gulati, supra note 14. 
 338 As Professor Kahan notes, if 
only a subset of holders is affected directly by the [debtor’s] action, the threshold requirement 
becomes harder to meet.  If the threshold―say, holders of 25% of the outstanding bonds―was 
reasonable assuming that the rights of all bondholders were affected, it can become oppressive if 
the affected subset holds only 40% or 20% of the outstanding bonds. 
Kahan, supra note 319, at 1075. 
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bondholders to take action, by commencing litigation, to limit the strategic 
actions of the sovereign debtor and the majority of the bondholders. 
These modest refinements to sovereign debt instruments, particularly fiscal 
agency agreements, are likely to provide an effective means of reducing the 
costs engendered by holdout litigation while facilitating the restructuring 
process and promoting the functioning of the international capital markets.  
Rather than requiring extensive changes throughout the market for sovereign 
debt, these reforms can be tailored to the circumstances of individual sovereign 
debtors. 
Importantly, these reforms can be tested in the market.  Once the modified 
terms are incorporated in agreements governing bonds issued by different 
sovereign debtors, we will be able to observe their effect on the incidence of 
holdout litigation.  In particular, we will be able to observe whether the 
modified terms appear to limit disruptive litigation in sovereign bond 
restructurings.  Moreover, we will be able to observe the effect of the modified 
terms on the prices of sovereign bonds. The resulting prices will indicate the 
value investors attribute to the modified terms and, indirectly, to the role of 
holdout litigation.  If including terms that reduce the availability of litigation in 
a sovereign debt instrument results in the bonds bearing a higher interest rate 
than similar bonds that are not subject to the terms, the difference in interest 
rates would support the argument that holdout litigation provides value to 
investors.  This evidence that the possibility of investors enforcing their rights 
through litigation adds value to sovereign bonds would suggest that 
enforcement rights should not be eliminated without careful analysis.  In 
contrast, the failure of investors to demand a premium to purchase bonds 
subject to terms limiting the ability of holders to accelerate the principal 
amounts of the bonds or to initiate litigation against the sovereign debtor 
would suggest that investors view these actions as strategic behavior by 
holdout creditors and not as enhancing the value of the bonds.339 
Despite the benefits of these modest reforms, sovereign debtors may adopt 
the modified terms we suggest only over an extended period of time, if they 
adopt them at all.  Participants in the sovereign debt market may view the 
possibility of holdout litigation under existing debt instruments as valuable for 
both the restructuring process and the market itself, and so they may perceive 
reforms designed to limit this possibility as unnecessary or inappropriate.  
 
 339 This result would be similar to the evidence indicating that bonds subject to CACs do not appear to 
trade at substantial discounts to similar bonds containing UACs.  These studies are identified supra note 281. 
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Moreover, frictions in the market may delay the modification of existing terms 
in sovereign debt instruments.  For example, participants in the sovereign debt 
market may have a strong preference for standard terms, not only across 
sovereign bonds issued by the same sovereign debtor but also across all 
sovereign bonds.340  To the extent a sovereign debtor elects to include a new 
term, including one of the modifications we propose, in an agreement 
governing an issue of bonds, the debtor will incur costs in both drafting the 
term and in marketing the bonds with the new term to investors.341  These costs 
may be sufficiently large to deter the introduction of new terms, particularly in 
cases in which the benefits of the new term are uncertain.  Moreover, attorneys 
who represent sovereign debtors and attorneys who represent underwriters, 
play a mediating role in determining the terms to be included in an agreement 
governing an issue of bonds.342  The attorneys may, despite the interests of 
their clients, be reluctant to negotiate, prepare, and implement new terms in the 
agreement as the costs to the attorneys are likely to be significantly greater 
than the benefits to the attorneys.343  In fact, while limited, the available 
 
 340 Some commentators, particularly legal scholars, have analyzed the preference for standard terms 
within the context of a bias in favor of the status quo.  See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path 
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 347, 359-62 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence] (analyzing the relevance of 
behavioral biases, including the status quo bias, for the persistence of standard contract terms); Russell 
Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and 
Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998) (analyzing the role of standard terms in form contracts in creating 
a bias among contracting parties for the status quo).  Legal scholars have also analyzed this preference within 
the framework of network effects among terms in agreements, particularly agreements governing bonds.  See 
Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 587-90 (1995) 
(describing the role of standardization in facilitating the evaluation of complex terms in bonds); Marcel Kahan 
& Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of 
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and Innovation] 
(analyzing the role of learning externalities and network externalities in contributing to the standardization of 
terms in corporate contracts); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 
VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) (analyzing the role of network externalities in determining terms in corporate 
contracts). 
 341 See Klausner, supra note 340, at 782-86 (analyzing the importance of legal services network effects 
and marketing network effects in determining corporate contract terms).  Robert Ahdieh has argued that legal 
services network effects may be particularly significant in the context of sovereign debt instruments and that 
marketing network effects may be the most important factor in influencing the preference for standard terms in 
sovereign debt instruments.  Ahdieh, supra note 287, at 718-21. 
 342 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 287, at 948, 974-80 (analyzing the role of attorneys in determining the 
terms contained in sovereign debt instruments, particularly standard terms); Kahan & Klausner, Path 
Dependence, supra note 340, at 353-58 (analyzing the importance of attorneys in determining the terms 
contained in corporate contracts, particularly standard terms). 
 343 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 287, at 995-96 (describing the incentives of attorneys to favor standard 
terms in sovereign debt instruments); Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 340, at 353-58 
(describing the reasons attorneys may favor standard terms in corporate contracts despite the interests of their 
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empirical evidence indicates that the preference for standardized terms retards 
the adoption of new terms in sovereign debt instruments and that attorneys 
play an important role in preserving the status quo in sovereign debt 
instruments.344 
Finally, even if sovereign debtors were to modify their debt instruments in 
the manner we suggest, our approach is not without limitations.  First, the 
utility of our approach depends upon the capacity of the sovereign debt market 
to price a variety of closely-related contractual terms.  To the extent the market 
is not able to price these terms accurately―through the interest rate borne by 
the bonds or the discounts from principal amounts reflected in trading 
prices―our approach is of limited use.  Yet, we expect that the market for 
sovereign debt is reasonably efficient.  In addition, our proposal limits the 
ability of sovereign debtors to rely on contractual uncertainty in an effort to 
prevent the market from fully pricing the risks associated with clarification of 
the scope of litigation rights.  Our proposal thus serves to enhance the 
efficiency of the sovereign debt market. 
Second, the reforms we suggest are designed to balance the power of 
bondholders relative to sovereign debtors and the power of minority 
bondholders relative to the majority of the bondholders.  The modifications we 
propose may not strike the appropriate balance.  We may observe too little 
litigation―so that the check on opportunistic defaults is removed―or too 
much litigation―so that restructurings are disrupted by lawsuits that serve 
only the interests of the bondholders pursuing the litigation.  Importantly, the 
incremental nature of our proposal, which allows the scope of litigation to be 
adjusted through modifications to the terms of subsequent issues of bonds, 
provides a process for responding to any problems that arise.345 
 
clients in customized terms); Korobkin, supra note 340, at 1594-95 (describing the benefits to attorneys of 
standardized terms). 
 344 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 287, at 995-97 (drawing these conclusions from an empirical analysis of 
changes in the terms of sovereign debt instruments from 1995 to early 2004).  But see Kahan & Klausner, 
Standardization and Innovation, supra note 340, at 742, 753-56 (detecting no evidence that attorneys assisted 
in the diffusion of learning benefits regarding new terms or that they promoted standardization by maintaining 
the consistency of new terms in trust indentures for corporate bonds issued between November 1988 and 
August 1993). 
 345 The relationship of the litigation remedy to the restructuring process is likely to provide the impetus 
for continuing modifications.  We have seen that the absence of litigation during the restructurings of the 
1930s and the 1980s resulted in dramatic changes in the sovereign debt market.  We can expect that not only 
too little but also too much litigation will impact the current restructuring process.  Moreover, because the 
reforms we suggest will result in relatively minor modifications to the terms of sovereign debt instruments, we 
can expect that any changes in the market for sovereign bonds will be modest. 
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Third, the modifications we propose relate only to individual issues of 
bonds, and so they do not provide a means of making adjustments through the 
restructuring process to different issues of bonds.  The modifications do, 
however, provide a means of gathering information regarding more 
fundamental changes in the terms of sovereign debt instruments and also the 
international financial architecture.  At the same time, the modifications may 
serve as “small changes [that] may help lead to even larger, later changes”346 
that Professor Choi and Professor Gulati identify as an important factor 
facilitating changes in the sovereign debt market. 
CONCLUSION 
Proposals to reform the process of sovereign debt restructuring have 
proliferated, largely in response to a concern that disruptive and harmful 
litigation by holdout creditors threatens the viability of voluntary 
restructurings.  We argue, however, that holdout litigation has emerged as a 
natural response to developments in the sovereign debt market, including 
concerns regarding opportunistic defaults by sovereign debtors and an increase 
in the heterogeneity among creditors.  Judicial enforcement of sovereign debt 
obligations enhances the operation of the sovereign debt market by lowering 
the cost of financing to sovereign debtors and increasing the value of the 
obligations to creditors. 
Broad reforms that rely on majority-driven decisionmaking or an 
international bankruptcy regime are premature.  At the same time, they pay 
insufficient attention to important differences in creditor interests.  Any reform 
demands a conception of intercreditor fairness that exceeds the scope of 
current reform proposals.  A claim of unfairness to minority creditors will 
present the same threat of disrupting a proposed restructuring whether it is 
presented in a court in the United States or the United Kingdom, in an 
international bankruptcy court, or to an international development organization 
like the IMF.  More importantly, regardless of the forum, creditors will have 
ample opportunity to pursue claims for strategic purposes in the hope of 
obtaining a superior payment. 
 
 346 Choi & Gulati, supra note 287, at 934. 
